







THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Back of the war are the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. They grouped the nations of Europe around what have proved to be the banners of two fundamentally opposite ideals. To know how the parties were bound is to understand how the world came to the present crisis; to know the circumstances and purposes of the bonds is to understand better what the foes are fighting for.

Of these arrangements no one but the expert in international affairs has had any real conception. To bring the texts together, to present them as wholes and thus reveal the spirit behind the engagements therefore seems worth while. The parties are given full opportunity for self-revelation in the following pages, and the record speaks for itself. Of the Triple Alliance Bismarck said: "No one will dare to measure himself with the Teuton fury which is manifested in case of an attack."¹ Kipling once defined the Triple Entente as "a linked and steadfast guard set for peace on earth."²

The engagements which caused the alignment of European powers in the world war were:

A. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

In its first form this consisted of:

1. The Austro-German treaty of defensive alliance, signed at Vienna, October 7, 1879, by Count Julius Andrassy, Austro-Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, and Prince Henry VII of Reuss, German ambassador.

2. Treaty of alliance between Italy and Austria-Hungary, signed at Vienna, May 20, 1882, by Count Kálnoky, Austro-Hungarian minister for foreign affairs, and Count Robilant, the Italian ambassador.

3. Treaty of alliance between Italy and the German Empire, signed at Vienna, May 20, 1882, by Prince Henry of Reuss and Count Robilant, the German and Italian ambassadors.

¹ *Archives diplomatiques*, xxv, 305.

² Quoted by Ernest Lavisse, *London Times*, Weekly Edition, April 17, 1914, 309.

4. Adhesion of Rumania to the Triple Alliance, signed at Gastein, August/September, 1883, by Jean Bratiano on behalf of Rumania.

(Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were revised into a single document in 1887.)

5. Military conventions concluded, *mutatis mutandis*, between the powers concerned, possibly dating in their original form from 1882/83.

6. Exchanges of letters between the sovereigns, possibly dating from the conclusion of the alliance and certainly existing in 1889.

7. Exchange of letters between Austria-Hungary and Italy, December 15/19, 1909, relating to the Sandjak of Novibazar and alteration of the Balkan *status quo*.

To these may be added:

8. Treaty of alliance between the German and Ottoman Empires, signed at Berlin, August 4, 1914, and possibly incorporating an earlier understanding.

9. Treaty of alliance between Bulgaria and the German and Ottoman Empires and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, concluded at Sofia, July 17, 1915, Bulgaria becoming a belligerent on October 14, 1915.

B. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE AND ITS FRIENDS

I. The Franco-Russian alliance, consisting of:

1. Exchange of letters at Paris, August 27, 1891, between Alexander Ribot, French minister of foreign affairs, and Baron Arthur Mohrenheim, Russian ambassador to France.

2. Military convention signed at St. Petersburg, August, 1892, by General Le Mouton de Boisdeffre, French assistant chief of the general staff, and General Obruchef, Russian chief of the general staff.

3. Agreement of alliance signed at Paris, March, 1894, by Nikolai Karlovich Giers, Russian minister of state, and Jean Casimir-Périer, French premier and minister of foreign affairs.

4. Naval convention signed at Paris, July 13, 1912, by Théophile Delcassé, French minister of marine, and Admiral Prince Lieven, Russian naval chief of the general staff.

II. The Anglo-French *entente*, first manifested in the treaty of general arbitration of October 14, 1903, consisting of:

1. Convention between Great Britain and France respecting Newfoundland and West and Central Africa, signed at London, April 8, 1904, by the Marquess of Lansdowne, British secretary

of state for foreign affairs, and Paul Cambon, the French ambassador.

2. Declaration and secret articles of Great Britain and France respecting Egypt and Morocco, signed at London, April 8, 1904, by the Marquess of Lansdowne, British secretary of state for foreign affairs and Paul Cambon, the French ambassador.

3. Declaration between Great Britain and France concerning Siam, Madagascar and the New Hebrides, signed at London, April 8, 1904, by the Marquess of Lansdowne, British secretary of state for foreign affairs, and Paul Cambon, the French ambassador.

4. Convention between Great Britain and France confirming the protocol signed at London on February 27, 1906, concerning New Hebrides, signed at London, October 20, 1906, by Sir Edward Grey, British secretary of state for foreign affairs, and Paul Cambon, the French ambassador.

5. Exchange of letters respecting armed assistance, London, November 22-23, 1912, by Sir Edward Grey, British secretary of state for foreign affairs, and Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador.

III. The Anglo-Russian *entente* was brought about by:

1. Convention respecting Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet signed at St. Petersburg, August 31, 1907, by Sir Arthur Nicolson, British ambassador to Russia, and Alexander P. Izvolski, Russian minister of foreign affairs.

IV. The Anglo-Japanese alliance:

1. Agreement between Great Britain and Japan relative to China, Korea (alliance, etc.), signed at London, January 30, 1902, by the Marquess of Lansdowne, British secretary of state for foreign affairs, and Count Tadasu Hayashi, Japanese minister at London; revised and superseded by

2. Agreement between Great Britain and Japan relative to Eastern Asia (China and Korea) and India, signed at London, August 12, 1905, by the Marquess of Lansdowne, British secretary of state for foreign affairs, and Count Tadasu Hayashi, Japanese minister at London; revised and superseded by

3. Agreement between the United Kingdom and Japan respecting rights and interests in Eastern Asia and India, signed at London, July 13, 1911, by Sir Edward Grey, British secretary of state for foreign affairs, and Takaaki Kato, Japanese ambassador at London.

V. The Anglo-Portuguese alliance, under which Portugal took the attitude which resulted in the German declaration of war of March 9, 1916, dates from 1373 and is not only the oldest existing political engagement in the world but is the longest friendship in history. It consists of portions of the following:

1. Treaty of peace, friendship and alliance between England and Portugal, signed at London, June 16, 1373.
2. Treaty of alliance between England and Portugal, signed at Windsor, May 9, 1386.
3. Treaty of peace, commerce and alliance between Great Britain and Portugal, signed at London, January 29, 1642.
4. Treaty of peace, commerce and alliance between Great Britain and Portugal, signed at Westminster, July 20, 1654.
5. Treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Portugal, signed at Whitehall, April 28, 1660.
6. Treaty between Great Britain and Portugal of marriage between his Majesty Charles II and the Princess Catherine, Infanta, signed at Whitehall, June 23, 1661.
7. Treaty of defensive alliance between Great Britain and Portugal, signed at Lisbon, May 16, 1703.
8. Convention of friendship and alliance between Great Britain and Portugal, signed at London, October 22, 1807.
9. Treaty of friendship and alliance between his Britannic Majesty and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, signed at Rio de Janeiro, February 19, 1810.

THE AUSTRO-GERMAN ALLIANCE

Alexander II of Russia, Emperor William I of Germany and Emperor-King Francis Joseph of Austria-Hungary met at Berlin September 5-12, 1872, the result being a general understanding among them and mutual explanations of foreign policies, without any written alliance. This League of the Three Emperors remained firm only three years. In 1876 the Tsar met Francis Joseph at Reichstadt and while in a carriage signed an understanding, converted into two formal documents signed at Vienna in January and March, 1877, by which Austria-Hungary secured the right of occupying Bosnia-Herzegovina in exchange for her neutrality in case of a successful Russian war against Turkey, while Bessarabia was to fall to Russia. Serbia and Montenegro were recognized as within the Austro-Hun-

garian sphere of influence or interest, and were to be territorially benefited in case of the dismemberment of Turkey.¹ This arrangement was effected without the knowledge or co-operation of Germany, according to the *North German Gazette*.

War broke out between Russia and Turkey on April 24, 1877, and was closed by the treaty of San Stefano of March 3, 1878. The terms of this treaty being unsatisfactory to the powers, the Congress of Berlin was held June 13–July 13, 1878, and resulted in the treaty of Berlin, revising the terms negotiated at San Stefano.

Russia's former friendliness toward Germany cooled after the congress, and political conditions determined Bismarck to bind Germany and Austria-Hungary together while the opportunity offered. The occasion was made by him in a few months. In carrying out the provisions of the treaty of Berlin a mixed commission in 1879 was working in Novibazar to delimit the western frontier of Turkey. In three letters to the Emperor of Germany the Tsar demanded that the German representative yield in all instances to the wishes of his Russian colleague. Alexander II wrote in effect that the acceptance by Germany of this demand was the condition of the maintenance of peace between the two peoples. Bismarck, who was at Gastein for his health, wrote to the emperor after reading these letters that, if this demand had been made in a Russian diplomatic document, he would have advised mobilization of the armed forces against Russia. He therefore requested the Kaiser to get the sequel handled through official channels. So far as appearances went the incident blew over; for the Tsar and Kaiser had a cordial meeting at Alexandrovo on September 3. But Bismarck, fearing a change of policy at Vienna after the retirement of Count Julius Andrassy, made use of the incident by passing the correspondence to the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister. The latter, scenting the possibility of a Franco-Russian alliance, replied that an Austro-German alliance would be the only counterweight. The Kaiser was unwilling to have such an alliance, but its terms were nevertheless negotiated by Bismarck and Andrassy on September 21–24, and the Kaiser's assent was obtained on the

¹ Archibald Cary Coolidge, *The Origins of the Triple Alliance*, 95–114; *London Times*, April 29, May 9, 1879.

29th,¹ though only after strong pressure was exerted. The treaty of October 7, 1879, was the result.²

The value of this treaty to Bismarck, who laid the course which the Germany of to-day has so eagerly followed, was frankly—and cynically—expressed the next year to a Russian diplomat: "Austria would be very much deceived if she thought that the security resulting from her relations to us was complete. Our interests compel us to prevent her being *destroyed*, but she is not guaranteed against attack. A war between Russia and Austria would place us, it is true, in a most embarrassing position, but our attitude in such an eventuality will be determined by our own interests, and not by engagements which have no existence. Our interests demand that neither Russia nor Austria be mortally wounded. Their existence as great powers is equally necessary to us. That is what will determine our conduct, should occasion arise."³

ITALY ENTERS THE COMBINATION

Francesco Crispi, then president of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, visited several European capitals in the autumn of 1877 and on September 16 had a conference with Prince Bismarck at which they discussed questions of policy and the possibility of an alliance. In conclusion Crispi said: "Then we must confine ourselves to a treaty of alliance in case we should be attacked by France." To which Bismarck rejoined: "I will take the Emperor's orders with a view to opening official negotiations for an alliance."⁴ In telegrams to the Italian king and the premier, Crispi stated that the alliance was to be defensive and offensive, that Germany refused an eventual treaty against Austria-Hungary, and that she was not interested in the Near Eastern question. Early in 1880, Italy again

¹ Hans Blum, *Das Deutsche Reich zur Zeit Bismarcks. Politische Geschichte von 1871 bis 1890* (Leipzig und Wien, Bibliographisches Institut, 1893), 219-220; in greater detail in his *Fürst Bismarck und seine Zeit. Eine Biographie für das deutsche Volk* (München, C. H. Beck, 1894-95), V, 285 ff., and referred to by Victor von Strantz, *Das Deutsche Reich, 1871-1895* (Berlin, R. von Decker's verlag, 1895), 76-78. See also *Archives diplomatiques*, 1893, IV, 331-332; Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman, II, 255-272.

² "An analogous treaty between the two powers for defense against France has not been published."—Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman, II, 272.

³ James Young Simpson, "Russo-German Relations and the Sabouroff Memoirs," *Nineteenth Century and After*, January, 1918, 67.

⁴ Tommaso Palamenghi-Crispi, *Memoirs of Francesco Crispi*, II, 37.

approached Bismarck with regard to an official alliance and received word that "the road to Berlin led through Vienna." In January, 1881, Italy sent an agent to Vienna, where Balkan affairs were discussed. As a result Italy felt that there was no serious obstacle to establishing a close and sincere friendship between Italy and Austria-Hungary. Formal negotiations between Berlin, Rome and Vienna followed.

The negotiations apparently continued for a year. They took a double form, Italy regarding Germany as a powerful friend to be conciliated and honored, while to her Austria-Hungary was a masked enemy to be mistrusted, watched and guarded against.¹

Bismarck was desirous of securing an engagement against France, but Italy would not consent to that, notwithstanding her disappointment at having seen France acquire Tunis by the treaty of Bardo of May 12, 1881. And Austria-Hungary again defeated that German ambition, having already refused to include such an engagement in her alliance with Germany. Andrassy held that there was nothing to put Austria-Hungary at variance with France, and offered to resign rather than take an engagement against France.² So Bismarck had to forego his desire at that time.

The terms of the alliance seem to have taken form as a result of Italy's demands. She sought support for her position and ambitions in the Mediterranean. This was refused, and the incident explains why Art. I of the treaty promises only "mutual support within the scope of their own interests." Even this vague engagement was too much for Austria-Hungary and as an offset to it the Ballplatz secured Art. VII, with the effect of heading off Italian efforts to get Albania. Italy also demanded a guaranty of her territorial integrity, aiming to end all danger of foreign intervention in behalf of the papacy. Austria-Hungary finally consented because such a guaranty would hinder the Italian Government's advocacy of Italia Irredenta, while Germany was willing to have another security for her position in Alsace-Lorraine. Germany was not interested in the Balkans, and therefore the treaty signed by her with Italy omitted the clause relating to the Near East.³

¹ Emile Joseph Dillon, *From the Triple Alliance to the Quadruple Alliance*, 28.

² Count Vincent Benedetti, *Studies in Diplomacy*, 120-121.

³ Coolidge, *The Origins of the Triple Alliance*, 211-212.

RUMANIA FORCED IN

As early as 1881 Austria-Hungary desired to bring Rumania under her as a protectorate. Therefore she raised the question of the Danube. A conference on the subject was held February 8-March 10, 1883, at London. Rumania applied by a note of February 1 for admission to this diplomatic gathering, which vitally affected her fluvial artery. Count Münster, the German delegate, opposed the application on the ground that, "if a vote was given to Rumania, a position not at all desirable would be created, the power at her volition to impose her veto." Austria-Hungary supported this idea and demanded that Servia, which similarly sought admission, should be considered on equal terms with Rumania. This objection, in view of the customary unanimity in diplomatic gatherings, resulted in a conference resolution to "invite Rumania and Serbia to attend its sessions in order to consult them and to understand their point of view." The small states were to sit at the table of the family of nations only as children. Rumania on February 12 replied that it could "not accept a situation which would give it only a consultative voice and which would not permit it to take part in the decisions of the conference." Serbia accepted. The conference meant much to Rumania and it disturbed her deeply to see Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, Russia and Turkey handling a matter of vital interest to her, while she herself was made impotent regarding it at the behest of Germany's ally, Austria-Hungary, her avowed enemy by reason of the unredeemed Rumanian population west of the Carpathians. The Danube was in general controlled by the European Commission, consisting of the above-named powers, and locally by the Mixed Commission, which was subordinate to the European body but, by the system of voting employed, subject to the will of Austria-Hungary. This situation explains Rumania's disturbance when in the session of February 10 Count Karolyi, the Austro-Hungarian delegate, urged that the executive character of the Mixed Commission should come before the conference. This "seemed indispensable to my Government to assure the regular execution of the regulations prepared by the European Commission," he said. He hoped that Rumania

would no longer refuse to accede to this proposition. In the session of February 13 Count Karolyi read a project, in which France objected to the word "executory"; Russia took the same view. Count Karolyi then "declared himself ready to abandon the word." Rumania protested against the final action of the conference, but to no avail.¹

GERMAN PRESSURE FOR SECRET DIPLOMACY

Said Take Ionescu in the Rumanian Chamber of Deputies: "Germany helped us, but at what price? The price, gentlemen, was our treaty of alliance with Austria." And he proceeds:

After that, as Rumania still objected, a new incident fell all of a sudden from the skies, which Austria seized upon. On June 5, 1883, at the unveiling of the statue of Stephen the Great at Jassy, Pierre Gradishteano . . . spoke at the banquet of the two pearls which were missing from the crown of Stephen the Great. Of these pearls, gentlemen, one, the larger, was beyond the Pruth, was Bessarabia; the other, the smaller, was the Bukovina.

No protest came from Russia, for Russia did not think that her military power would dissolve in a glass of champagne, so that she could no longer defend her frontier. But from beyond the mountains, where the desire was to pick a quarrel with us at any cost, and at any cost, as in the case of Serbia, to put an end to Rumanian arrogance, bred of the victories on the plains of Bulgaria, and regarded as menacing to Hungary—from beyond the mountains came formidable protests. Our excuses, the explanations which followed, availed us nothing. The situation had become intolerable. . . .

And then, gentlemen, Jean Bratiano went on leave for 40 days, on July 12; King Carol left on August 4. He met Jean Bratiano on August 6 at Breslau. On August 10, Bratiano returned home. From Berlin the King went to Vienna, and stayed at the Burg. He returned to Prédéal on August 16. Lastly, on August 23, Bratiano set off again, for 15 days, to Gastein. It was then that the alliance was concluded. . . .

The conclusion of this alliance came, not so much from our fear of Russia, as from the fact that our other neighbor made our life intolerable, and that we found no other means except the alliance to make our existence

¹ Ministerul afacerilor straine. *Cestunea Dunarei, Acte si documente* (Bucuresti, 1883), 833-840, 842, 912. The protocols are also printed in *Archives Diplomatiques*, 2^e série, VII, 216-262.

tolerable. In exchange the protocol about the Danube was naturally given up, for no one wishes to throttle an ally; that would be superfluous; one keeps that for neutrals or one's enemies.¹

In August or September, 1883, Rumania became a silent partner in the Triple Alliance, signing a treaty identical with that of Italy. How closely the text was guarded is shown by Alexander Marghiloman, former Rumanian foreign secretary: "I myself, though I was foreign secretary, had never seen that treaty . . . and knew only some of its stipulations from verbal communications made to me by the prime minister. . . . When the fateful Crown council was held at Sinaia, in 1914, which, under the presidency of King Carol, decided on Rumania's attitude, this treaty lay on the table, but only three of those present knew its contents, though it was to form the chief subject of the deliberations."²

CHANGES IN THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

In 1887 German policy had changed toward Balkan affairs and the presence of Rumania in the alliance also doubtless contributed to its being given a new form. The renewal of that year was made in a single document. It was probably at that time that the exchange of letters between the sovereigns took place, possibly having been preceded by similar letters of a less formal character. Doubtless the military undertakings of the alliance were revised at the same time.

The renewal of May 6, 1891, also involved a revision. Marquis di Rudini, Italian minister of foreign affairs, "imparted to it a marked economic character which, besides satisfying certain needs of his country, insensibly blunted the anti-French point of the alliance,"³ which had been given to it as a result of the commercial negotiations

¹ Take Ionescu, *The Policy of National Instinct*. A speech delivered . . . in the Roumanian Chamber of Deputies during the sitting of 16th & 17th December, 1915 (London, Sir Joseph Causton & Sons, 1916), pp. 79-83.

² War and Peace, February, 1918, page 185. Nevertheless, the knowledge of Rumania's participation in the alliance has been common in well-informed circles for 20 years. For instance, Andrew D. White, American ambassador to Germany and chairman of the American delegation to the First Hague Conference, referring to Germany's opposition to arbitration proposals at that conference, wrote in his diary on June 9, 1899: "There are also signs that the German Emperor is influencing the minds of his allies—the sovereigns of Austria, Italy, Turkey and Rumania—leading them to oppose it." (Autobiography of Andrew D. White, II, 294.)

³ Emile Joseph Dillon, *From the Triple to the Quadruple Alliance*, 35-36.

under the ægis of the treaty. This was accomplished only with difficulty and with after-effects. Italy desired a commercial treaty which Germany and Austria-Hungary refused to sign. Rudini gained his point by writing to Count Eberhard zu Solms-Sonnenwalde, the German ambassador at Rome: "Your Excellency, the delay in ratifying these commercial treaties is a species of blackmail on the part of the government you represent. I have the honor to inform you that if the pending treaty is not signed within 24 hours I shall tear up the Triple Alliance and announce the reasons to the world." The treaties in question were signed on December 6, 1891, being similar to each other in text.¹

MOMENTOUS CHANGE OF ATTITUDE

Art. VII of the main treaty proved in the course of time to be its crucial provision. The publication of its text throws a flood of light backward upon the motley events of successive Balkan crises, while it establishes a certain continuity between various Balkan incidents dating from the treaty of Berlin in 1878. In 1882, when the alliance was concluded, Germany had been so little interested in the Balkans that she signed a separate treaty with Italy omitting reference to that region. Bismarck then considered the Near East an unavoidable pawn on the chessboard of relations with Austria-Hungary and Russia. But by 1887 he had altered that view and was willing to make the preservation of the Balkan *status quo* one of the *casus fœderis* of the Triple Alliance for Germany. This change fixed Berlin's eyes upon the Near East, contributed to the birth of the *Drang nach Osten* idea, encouraged in its degree the development of the Berlin-Bagdad conception and the Turko-German *rapprochement*, which culminated in the actual alliance of 1914. Thus Art. VII proved to be the point of application for the inherent menace of the Triple Alliance to European peace. The Young Turk revival

¹Treaty of commerce, customs and navigation between Germany and Italy, *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XVII, 712-809; treaty of commerce and navigation between Italy and Austria-Hungary, Neumann, *Traité de l'Autriche-Hongrie*, XV, 97-249. Germany signed a treaty of the same character with Austria-Hungary and Belgium on the same day. The treaty with Italy superseded the one of May 4, 1883. All the treaties mentioned represented a new German commercial policy.

The quotation is taken from an article in the *New York World* said to have been supplied to it from official Italian sources.

of the Ottoman constitution on July 10, 1908, was followed on October 1 by the declaration of Bulgarian independence from Turkey and on October 3 by Austria-Hungary's proclamation annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkish provinces till then occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary under the terms of the treaty of Berlin. This violent rupture of the Balkan *status quo* created a crisis of magnitude and was the first of the train of circumstances which led directly to the world war—the Turko-Italian war, the Balkan wars and the ultimatum to Serbia.

The Bosnia-Herzegovinian crisis was a test for the Triple Alliance, its effect on the relations between Italy and Austria-Hungary being recorded in the instructions of December 15, 1909, which are printed as part of the alliance.¹ The crisis had the effect of welding Germany and Austria-Hungary closer together. Early in the affair Emperor William sent to Francis Joseph a letter in which he is alleged to have asserted that "Germany stands steadfastly with Austria-Hungary not only in consequence of the alliance, but also by reason of the agreement of their interests."² That was assuredly Germany's attitude, for on September 21, 1910, the Kaiser had occasion to reply to a welcome by the burgomaster of Vienna, who referred to "the inmost joy of Austria-Hungary, which recently had occasion once more to recognize the Nibelung loyalty of the German Empire and of its exalted ruler." And Emperor William replied: "Me-thinks I read in your resolve the agreement of the city of Vienna with the action of an ally in taking his stand in shining armor at a grave moment by the side of your most gracious sovereign. This was at once an injunction of duty and of friendship; for the alliance has, to the weal of the world, passed into and pervaded as an imponderable element the convictions and the life of both peoples."³

ITALY STRAINS AT THE LEASH

Italy's position in the alliance was strained as a result of that part of the Turko-Italian war which extended Italian military operations to the Turkish islands. Austria-Hungary protested against

¹ See text, pages 221-222.

² London *Times*, Weekly Edition, October 23, 1909, 675.

³ *Ibid.*, September 23, 1910, 725.

the disturbance of the *status quo* and a rancorous correspondence ensued. After the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Serbia on July 28, 1914, Italy was enabled to return the compliment in Austria-Hungary's own words. On July 26 the Duke of Avarna, Italian ambassador at Vienna, wrote to Count Berchtold, the Vienna minister of foreign affairs: "Should the threatening conflict lead to war and concurrently to an even temporary occupation of Serbian territory, the Italian Government, in accordance with Art. VII of the treaty of the Triple Alliance, would reserve its right to claim compensation, with regard to which an agreement should be reached in advance."¹ Austria-Hungary sought freedom of action and declared that, as she contemplated no territorial acquisitions, she would nevertheless be prepared to discuss "an eventual compensation" if she were "compelled to decide upon an occupation which could not be considered as merely provisional."² Germany in the main sided against Austria-Hungary and held that the Italian interpretation of Art. VII should be acknowledged even if Italy remained neutral.³ After this expression of German opinion, Count Berchtold telegraphed on August 23, to Baron Macchio, Austro-Hungarian ambassador at Rome: "I authorize you to declare to the Rome cabinet, in conjunction with your German colleague, that we accept unreservedly the Italian interpretation of the term '*dans les régions des Balkans*' in Art. VII, not only for the present crisis, but also for the whole duration of the treaty. This declaration implies our willingness to enter into negotiations with Italy concerning compensation in the case of a temporary or permanent occupation of a territory in the Balkans by us."⁴ This did not quite meet the Italian contention, which was summarized by Count Berchtold on December 12, in the following language: "Under the terms of that article we were obliged to come to an understanding with Italy before our occupation of Servian territory, were it only temporary. We, therefore, should have notified the Italian cabinet and effected an understanding before we crossed the Servian frontier."⁵

¹ Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. XV, p. 21.

² *Ibid.*, No. XV, p. 21.

³ *Ibid.*, No. XLII, p. 39.

⁴ *Ibid.*, No. XLIV, 40-41.

⁵ *Ibid.*, No. LXXIV, 54; cf. Italian Green Book, No. 3.

TURKEY'S ENTRANCE INTO THE ALLIANCE

It is well known that the moving spirit in the Young Turk movement of 1908, Enver Bey, was a pronounced Germanophil. It is probable that the settlement of the 1908-9 Balkan crisis, which was relatively to Turkey's advantage, was due in this respect somewhat to German influence. In 1910 there was considerable discussion in well-informed quarters of Turkey's joining the Triple Alliance. During the Turko-Italian war Germany favored Turkey at the expense of Italy. Evidence of this, according to documents published by the New York *World*, exists in a dispatch from Jules Cambon, French ambassador at Berlin, to the French Foreign Office dated in the spring or early summer of 1912. During a conference between Cambon and the Kaiser the Turkish ambassador was announced. "The Kaiser," says the account, "directed the caller to be shown in at once, and remarked to M. Cambon that he was just the man he wanted to see. M. Cambon asked if he should retire, but the Kaiser said 'No.' The Turk was shown into the room where the French ambassador still sat. The Emperor rushed to meet the caller, shook a quivering finger in his face, and cried, 'I am ashamed of you, I am ashamed of Turkey. We believed you could beat the Italians. Had we not thought so, we should not have backed you. Now we see we put our money on the wrong horse.'"¹ This evidence tends to give credence to the statements made by a diplomat at Athens to the correspondent of the London *Morning Post*² to the effect that Turkey made a secret treaty with Germany some years before 1914.

ANGLO-ITALIAN MEDITERRANEAN AGREEMENT

In February, 1887, Great Britain reached understandings with Austria-Hungary and Italy. For several years these caused Great Britain, apparently erroneously, to be associated with the Triple Alliance by the political wiseacres. Gottlieb von Jagow, former German secretary for foreign affairs, for instance, in replying to Prince Lichnowsky, referred to these agreements as an effort of Bismarck to bring Great Britain into a closer relationship to the Central European

¹ London *Times*, Weekly Edition, September 28, 1917, page 794.

² See page 222, note.

league, and make her share its burdens because "Austria-Hungary, supported by Italy and England, held the balance against Russia."

Marquis Antonio Starrabba di Rudini on June 29, 1891, declared in the Italian Parliament that the statements made on several occasions by Sir James Fergusson, British parliamentary under-secretary for foreign affairs, strictly conformed to the truth. These were in reply to questions by the late Henri Labouchère. On February 10, 1888, he stated that "no engagement pledging the material action of this country has been entered into by her Majesty's Government which is not known to this House," and a few days later defined the phrase "material action" as implying "military responsibility." On February 14, Labouchère asked whether "the statement in the *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna, that the treaties which were signed last year between the Central European powers 'are supplemented by special arrangements between Italy, Austria and Great Britain, having for their object the defense of the Austrian and Italian coasts against a hostile country;' whether any arrangements of this nature . . . were a matter of diplomatic correspondence during last year; and, whether, if so, this resulted in any arrangement. . . ." In reply Fergusson stated "that we are under no engagements pledging the military—in which, of course, is included the naval—action of this country, except such as are already known to the House. . . ." On July 19, 1889, he asserted: "The action of her Majesty's Government, in the improbable event of war breaking out . . . , will doubtless be decided, like all other questions of policy, by the circumstances of that particular time and the interests of this country. Her Majesty's Government are under no engagements or understandings fettering their liberty in that respect." And still later on June 4, 1891, he said: "Her Majesty's Government retained their full liberty of judgment as to what action we should take and as to what means we should employ in any conceivable circumstances. At the same time, Italian statesmen are well aware that her Majesty's Government are at one with them in desiring that there shall be no disturbance of the existing order in the Mediterranean and adjacent seas, and that the sympathies of this country would be on the side of those who would maintain a policy so important for the British interest involved."¹

¹ Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, CCCXXII, 153; CCCXXII, 377; CCCXXXVIII, 850; CCCXXXIX, 1058; CCCLIII, 1607.

Julius Hansen writing of this understanding in 1891 gave a typically diplomatic view of it in the following words: "No treaty had been signed, it is true, between these two powers, the Foreign Office being opposed in principle to the conclusion of a secret alliance. But from an exchange of views between the London and Rome cabinets a promise of understanding resulted. The Foreign Office had in effect declared that in case of a war between Austria and Russia or between France and Italy in the Mediterranean, under the conditions foreseen by the protocols of the Triplice, England would intervene against Russia in the first case and against France in the second. But the Foreign Office did not, however, admit that this declaration involved for the British Government the obligations arising from a *casus foederis*."¹

The effect of the *rapprochement* was seen in protocols between the Governments of Great Britain and Italy for the demarkation of their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Africa, signed at Rome, March 24 and April 15, 1891,² and an additional protocol of May 5, 1894.³ It is well known that the British-Italian friendliness continued and even increased.

CENTRAL POWERS IN ALLIANCE WITH AND AGAINST RUSSIA

The relations between the two sets of allies before the present war are very enlightening. In fact, the Franco-Russian alliance was the result of what Alexander Félix Joseph Ribot defined as a singular paradox. "At the same time that Germany made with Austria a treaty against Russia she obtained from Russia a promise of benevolent neutrality for the case where she found herself at war with another country, of such a character that we should have found

¹ Jens Julius Hansen, *L'Alliance franco-russe*, 83-84. Marquis Rudini in a letter to Maggiorino Ferraris was even more definite: "Should Italy be attacked, England would come to its aid from the maritime side. Any alteration of the *status quo*, which is inconsistent with the interests of both states, would result in a joint Anglo-Italian action and England also is obliged to protect Italy in case the latter should be drawn into war through its relation with the Triple Alliance. A special agreement between England and the Triple Alliance does not exist; England will participate in it only by means of Italy."—(Cited in Friedrich Heinrich Geffcken, *Frankreich, Russland und der Dreibund*, 155; Arthur Singer, *Geschichte des Dreibundes*, 262-263.)

² Texts in 83 British and Foreign State Papers, 19-21; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XVIII, 175-179; *Archives diplomatiques*, XXXVIII, 250-260; Hertslet's Commercial Treaties, XIX, 686-688. Notes exchanged between the British and Italian Governments respecting the Italian agreement of 1905 with Seyid Mahamed-bin-Abdulla, London, March 19, 1907 (100 British and Foreign State Papers, 543-546) showed that the *rapprochement* continued in the colonial sphere, while the two powers eventually made a series of agreements respecting Aden, the Red Sea, the Adalia-Burdur line in Asia Minor and other points of contact.

³ Hertslet's Commercial Treaties, XIX, 689-690.

ourselves isolated if war broke out, but that Russia found herself exposed on her side to isolation and thus delivered up to the superior arbitration of Germany. She desired to recover her independence; she did not do it simply from sympathy for France, she acted from the feeling of her permanent interest."¹

The treaty thus referred to was an alliance between Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia signed at Berlin, June 18, 1881, for a period of three years by Petr Saburov, Prince Bismarck and Count Széchenyi, and in its first form provided:

1. In case one of the three powers should find itself at war with a fourth great power, the other two will preserve a benevolent neutrality toward it, and will devote their efforts to the localizing of the conflict.

This stipulation shall also apply to a war between one of the three powers and Turkey, but only in case a previous agreement has been arranged between the three courts relative to the results of that war.

In the special case that one of them shall have obtained from one of its two allies a more positive assistance, the obligation of the present article shall continue in full force for the third.

This treaty was revised and re-signed for a period of three years on March 27, 1884, at Berlin by Prince Bismarck, Count Orlov and Count Széchenyi, and expired June 27, 1887.²

This treaty, lasting through six years, underwrote Germany against a French attack. "Our stake," said Bismarck to Saburov before the negotiations commenced, "is the conservation of Alsace-Lorraine," and he suggested the line of his policy by adding later that "a mutual guaranty against coalitions is perhaps preferable nowadays to a territorial guaranty."³ The negotiations were conducted primarily between Bismarck and Saburov and during their course called forth various remarks from Bismarck derogatory to Austria-Hungary. On one occasion he said: "Our projected arrangement . . . offers us the great advantage of keeping Austria better in leading strings and forcing her, should occasion arise, into an *entente*." And again:

¹ *Annales du Sénat. Débats parlementaires*, LXXVIII, 461 (April 6, 1911).

² On this treaty see: Serge Goriainov, "The End of the Alliance of the Emperors," *American Historical Review*, XXIII, 324-349; James Young Simpson, "Russo-German Relations and the Sabouroff Memoirs," *Nineteenth Century and After*, December, 1917, 1111-1123; January, 1918, 60-75; Hermann Hofmann, *Fürst Bismarck (1890-98)*, II, 370-372.

³ Simpson, *loc. cit.*, December, 1917, 1114.

"The only power that will have any inclination to default is Austria. That is why, with her, an alliance *à trois* is preferable to an alliance *à deux*." ¹

GERMANY "REINSURES" WITH RUSSIA AGAINST AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

It is probable that the arrangements effected between Great Britain and Italy and Austria-Hungary in February, 1887, had something to do with the events that immediately followed. But the character of those agreements in no wise excused Bismarck's next step. On May 11, 1887, Count Petr Andreevich Shuvalov, Russian ambassador at Berlin, broached to him the question of a dual agreement. Bismarck responded favorably and in the course of the conversation read to the Russian the text of the Austro-German alliance of 1879.² This in itself was a violation of the terms of Art. III of the alliance, which enjoins absolute secrecy. The negotiations for a Russo-German treaty were soon completed and on June 18 the text of this re-insurance treaty was signed. Its first article, containing the most important provision, was drafted by Bismarck himself on Shuvalov's request after the Russian had confessed that he did not feel strong enough to contend with the German over the matter. The treaty itself, the text of which has been available only since January last, reads:

The Imperial Courts of Russia and Germany, animated by an equal desire to confirm general peace by an understanding designed to assure the defensive position of their respective states, have resolved to embody in a special arrangement the accord established between them, against the expiration on June 15/27, 1887, of the treaty signed in 1881 and renewed in 1884. To this end the plenipotentiaries of the two courts have agreed on the following articles:

Art. I. In the case that one of the high contracting parties should find itself at war with a third great power, the other would maintain toward it a benevolent neutrality and would devote its efforts to the localization of the conflict.

This provision shall not apply to a war against Austria or France resulting from an attack made upon one of these two powers by one of the high contracting parties.

¹ Simpson, *loc. cit.*, January, 1918, 68, 70.

² Saburov during his negotiations in 1880-81 with Bismarck was certain of the existence of the Austro-German alliance.

Art. II. Germany recognizes the rights historically acquired by Russia in the Balkan peninsula, and particularly the rightfulness of a preponderating and decisive influence on her part in Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. The two courts pledge themselves to permit no modification of the territorial *status quo* in that peninsula without a previous agreement between them, and to oppose, as it arises, every attempt to disturb that *status quo* or to modify it without their consent.

Art. III. The two courts recognize the European and naturally obligatory character of the principle of the closing of the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, founded on the law of nations, confirmed by treaties, and set forth in the declaration made by the second plenipotentiary of Russia at the Congress of Berlin, in the session of July 12 (Protocol 19).¹ They will take care in common that Turkey makes no exception to this rule in favor of the interests of any government by lending to military operations of a belligerent power that portion of its empire adjoining the straits. In case of infraction or to prevent infraction in case it is in prospect, the two courts shall warn Turkey that they would consider her, if such were to take place, as having put herself in a state of war with the injured party, and as having deprived herself henceforth of the benefits of security assured to her territorial *status quo* by the treaty of Berlin.²

In a protocol signed the same day, it was declared that, in order to complete the stipulations of Arts. II and III of the treaty, the two courts had agreed upon the following points:

1. Germany, as in the past, will aid Russia to re-establish in Bulgaria a regular and legal government. She promises that she will in no case give consent to the restoration of the Prince of Battenberg.

2. In case the Emperor of Russia should find himself obliged to take over the task of defending the entrance into the Black Sea in order to safeguard the interests of Russia, Germany engages to lend benevolent neutrality and her moral and diplomatic support to the measures which his Majesty shall deem it necessary to take in order to guard the key of his empire.³

¹ "The plenipotentiaries of Russia, without being able to accept completely the proposition of the second plenipotentiary of Great Britain concerning the closing of the straits, are minded to request on their side insertion in the protocol of the observation:

"That in their opinion the principle of the closing of the straits is a European principle, and that the provisions concluded on this matter in 1841, 1856 and 1871, and now confirmed by the treaty of Berlin, are obligatory on the part of all the powers, conformably to the spirit and the letter of the existing treaties, not only toward the Sultan but toward all the powers signatory of these transactions."—*Das Staatsarchiv*, XXXIV, 274.

² Serge Goraiinov, "The End of the Alliance of the Emperors," *American Historical Review*, XXIII, 338-339.

³ *Ibid.*, 339.

The treaty was to expire in 1890. In 1889 the Russian minister of foreign affairs was directed to study whether renewal of the treaty should take place. The decision was that it should, and on December 19 the Tsar ordered arrangements to that end, the renewal negotiations not to begin before April, 1890. In a conversation on February 12, 1890, Bismarck said to Shuvalov: "I vote for the continuance of our entente." Shuvalov was doubtless right when, in reporting this conversation, he ventured the opinion that "to Bismarck our entente is in some sort a guarantee that no written agreement exists between us and France, and that is very important for Germany." William II of Germany dropped Bismarck as his pilot on March 20, 1890. Three days before, when the Kaiser had already accepted the Prince's resignation, Shuvalov had seen the prince and had been told that William II had objected to his chancellor's Russo-phil policy. Yet the Kaiser sent for the Russian ambassador in the night of March 21 and, at the ensuing interview at 8 A.M., declared: "I beg you to tell his Majesty that on my part I am entirely disposed to renew our agreement. . . . Nothing has changed either in my personal sentiments toward him or in my policy in regard to Russia." The Tsar annotated this dispatch: "We shall see by the sequel whether deeds correspond with words." And the sequel was that the Berlin pundits first determined to transfer the negotiations to St. Petersburg, and when General Schweinitz, German ambassador to Russia, opened his long-awaited instructions to proceed he found they were orders to refuse to renew the treaty. "In my secret heart, I am well content," wrote the Tsar on the report of the incident.¹ Russia was free to cultivate the friendship of France.

FRANCE AND RUSSIA MAKE FRIENDS

An entirely different spirit from that of the Triple Alliance—as different as the purposes of the contesting sides in the present war—is evident from the beginning in the history of the Triple Entente which was taking form as the new ruler of Germany was breaking from his Russian moorings.

¹ Goriainov, *loc. cit.*, 341-344. Chancellor Georg Leo von Caprivi was, of course, the person technically responsible for the decision and his explanation was that the Germany's treaty relations with Austria-Hungary and Russia were "too complicated." Bismarck retorted that they "of course required a considerable degree of diplomatic skill." (Hofmann, *Fürst Bismarck*, II, 4.)

The Triple Entente had for its foundation the Dual Alliance between France and Russia. Instead of a friendship forced by grim necessity and based on sharp dealings, we here find amity the natural result of mutual interest based on a ready acceptance of the equality and the equal rights of the parties.

In 1888 Russian bonds were depressed on the Berlin exchange. On November 20 a Russian 4% loan of 500 million francs was authorized, and was offered at Paris, London, Amsterdam and St. Petersburg. In France alone 1,163,000,000 francs was subscribed and Russian rentes rose everywhere except at Berlin. At that time Charles Louis de Saulces de Freycinet, minister of war in the Floquet cabinet, advocated a program of military reorganization. One day Major-General Baron Frederiks, Russian military attaché and an old friend, called upon him and engaged him in a familiar conversation. Russia, he at length proposed, would like to rearm its troops with a French modeled rifle. The proposal was submitted to the cabinet and agreed to. Shortly after, early in November, Grand Duke Vladimir, brother of the Tsar, asked M. Freycinet to examine the French Lebel rifle and its ammunition. After this examination, Baron Frederiks called on the minister of war and inquired if France would manufacture 500,000 of the weapon for Russia.

"We ask nothing better than to satisfy you," said M. Freycinet in a tone half serious, half jocular. "Only we would have to be assured that the guns would never shoot at us."

"We understand that perfectly," returned the Russian in the same voice, "and we will give you every guaranty on that point."

A few days later M. Freycinet met Baron Arthur Mohrenheim, the Russian ambassador, and repeated his conversation with the attaché. The baron said:

"Not only do I approve what Frederiks said to you, but I am myself ready to use his words on my own account."

"That being so," continued M. Freycinet, "would you accept a conversation on the subject with M. Goblet, our minister of foreign affairs?"

"Certainly," replied Baron Mohrenheim, and negotiations began without delay.¹

¹ Pierre Albin, *La paix armée. L'Allemagne et la France en Europe (1885-1894)*, 264-267.

Between that conversation and the actual signing of any document there was a period of nearly three years. Franco-Russian relations during this time grew more cordial, notwithstanding several incidents capable of creating tension. Events recent at the time suggested the possibility that Great Britain might associate herself with the powers of the Triple Alliance, and this created in the mind of Alexander III a noticeable pro-French disposition. The expiration of the Russo-German treaty on June 18, 1890, left Russia free to make new arrangements.

The actual Franco-Russian negotiations were rapidly conducted when once seriously begun.

Alexander Ribot was minister of foreign affairs in the fourth Freycinet ministry in the spring of 1891. Lefebvre de Laboulaye, the French ambassador at St. Petersburg, was on leave at Paris in April and he, M. Ribot and Baron Mohrenheim, together with Premier Freycinet, began *pourparlers* which lasted about two months. On July 22 a French squadron anchored at Kronstadt, Admiral Gervais and his men enjoying extraordinary courtesies during their stay in Russian waters, which lasted until August 10. On August 12 Baron Mohrenheim was ordered to St. Petersburg, where he had an audience of the Tsar on the 18th. At that time a text was agreed upon and it was formally signed immediately after Mohrenheim's return to Paris on the 22nd.

DISTANCE DOES NOT SEPARATE

The fact of the agreement was announced almost immediately. On August 31 Baron Mohrenheim, speaking at Cauterets in reply to an ovation, said: "The preparations you have made for my return would almost justify me in believing I had not been absent. It is true that distance does not always separate and that absence may itself be a drawing together." Premier de Freycinet on September 10 referred at a luncheon to general officers and military attachés to France as being "in a new situation."¹ On September 29 at Bapaume, M. Ribot, minister of foreign affairs, referred to the "profound sympathies" uniting Russia and France as illustrated by recent manifestations. "What is true of internal policy is even more true

¹ Jens Julius Hansen, *L'Alliance franco-russe*, 69, 71, 72-73; *Archives diplomatiques*, XL, 212-213.

of external policy; results are not improvised; they are the consequence and the reward of a long series of efforts.”¹

The exchange of notes of August 27, 1891, satisfied neither the French Premier Freycinet, nor the actual military alignment of Europe. Since the conversation of 1888 there had been more or less interchange of military ideas between France and Russia. In 1891, with the approval of General Vannovski, Russian minister of war, Russian officers had got into touch with the French general staff “to initiate arrangements for transportation of troops and provisioning.”² In October an Austro-German mixed commission composed of general staff officers was appointed for the purpose of assuring the eventual collaboration of the allied forces against Russia. Nikolai Karlovich Giers, Russian minister of state, arrived in Paris November 17, 1891, and left five days later. On the 21st at a conference between him, Ambassador Mohrenheim, Premier Freycinet and Minister Ribot a military convention was agreed to in principle. Negotiations were well advanced when the Freycinet ministry fell on February 18, 1892, to be followed by a Loubet ministry in which Ribot and Freycinet respectively retained the portfolios of foreign affairs and war. Negotiations continued and the French assistant chief of the general staff, General Le Mouton de Boisdeffre, went to Russia in mid-August for the ostensible purpose of attending the Russian maneuvers. Toward the end of the month he exchanged with General Obruchef the signed copies of the Franco-Russian military convention.

ALLIANCE SIGNED AFTER NAVAL FRATERNIZING

Political events in 1893 caused both France and Russia keenly to appreciate the advantages of their mutual friendship. On October 13 a Russian squadron under Admiral Avellane anchored at Toulon and for two weeks was the object of unbridled French enthusiasm, culminating in an exchange of cordial telegrams between President Carnot and the Tsar. Under the impulse of this courtesy Jules Develle, minister of foreign affairs at Paris, and M. Giers at St. Petersburg virtually concluded negotiations for a formal alliance by the end of November. The Dupuy cabinet, of which Develle

¹ *Archives diplomatiques*, XL, 214.

² Albin, *op. cit.*, 334; Hansen, *op. cit.*, 86.

was a member, was succeeded on December 3 by a ministry in which Jean Paul Pierre Casimir-Périer was both premier and minister of foreign affairs. In February, 1894, Baron Mohrenheim went on leave and on March 6 had an audience of the Tsar during which the text of the Franco-Russian alliance was approved. A few days later M. Giers at St. Petersburg and M. Casimir-Périer at Paris formally signed the documents, apparently an exchange of notes, which transformed the entente of 1891 into an alliance and rendered the military convention of 1892 diplomatically executory.

The alliance, known to exist, was officially announced in the session of the Chamber of Deputies on June 10, 1895. Gabriel Albert Auguste Hanotaux, the historian, then referred to it in these words:

Two great powers drawn to each by the attraction of their sentiments and their respective interests have given each other their hands. They have entered into an entente which brings them naturally together in the incessant work of current policy and which, always pacific, guarantees a reciprocal security.¹

Premier Ribot followed with a more definite statement:

We have allied the interests of France to the interests of a great nation. We have done it for the safeguarding of peace and the maintenance of European equilibrium. And if there has been no change in aspirations, in the superior guidance and in the supreme purpose of our policy, there has perhaps been something of change in Europe since 1891.²

And at the end of the discussion a vote was taken, 362 against 105, by which "the Chamber, approving the declaration of the Government," passed to the order of the day.³

Seventeen years later, on April 6, 1911, M. Ribot told of the scope and spirit of the alliance in the French Senate. He said:

It is pacific, that is certain; it was made with pacific intentions. It is defensive; who is surprised at that? . . . When two great nations make an alliance of long duration, they bind their policies not only with a view to maintaining peace, . . . they bind themselves with a view to all the eventualities which cannot be foreseen and which they do not control.

¹ *Journal officiel*, Chambre des députés, June 10, 1895, 1647, col. 1.

² *Ibid.*, 1651, col. 3.

³ *Ibid.*, 1653, col. 3; 1654.

They reserve the right to follow events, to concert policy and, the case arising, to draw from it all advantages. . . . The two powers were in concert on all questions which affected the general peace. That was a necessity of the contract; that was the engagement which had been taken. The necessity for this concerting has perhaps some times been forgotten in the practice of the alliance. . . . The concert does not only presuppose demonstrations of friendship or sympathy, it presupposes conversations, and not only conversation on incidents already born, . . . but conversations in view of hypotheses which may be presented, in order that common action may be arranged in time to avoid hesitations and uncertainties which might overtax the alliance itself.¹

TREATY RELATIONS BETWEEN ALLIED GROUPS

The next developments were between members of the allied groups. Balkan and Mediterranean problems were the subjects of the arrangements. On the one hand Austria-Hungary and Russia established spheres of influence in the Near East and on the other France and Italy reached an understanding on the political problems of the Middle Sea. The Near Eastern arrangement produced nothing permanent and encouraged no friendship nor genuine co-operation for peace, but the Franco-Italian agreement created an entente which resulted in an increasing friendliness, a real *modus vivendi* between two adjacent states whose alliance engagements elsewhere tended to make them hostile. International politics can improve only when the possibility of friendship is emphasized in policy equally with the possibility of hostility. The next ten years, between the signing of the Franco-Russian alliance and the conclusion of the Anglo-French entente, afford examples of each possibility.

AUSTRO-RUSSIAN EFFORT TO KEEP BALKAN PEACE

An understanding was arranged between Austria-Hungary and Russia during the visit of Emperor-King Francis Joseph to St. Petersburg, April 25-29, 1897. According to the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of May 16, 1898, the treaty was obligatory until May 1, 1902, unless prolonged by tacit agreement, and had as its purpose the main-

¹ *Annales du Sénat. Débats parlementaires*, LXXVIII, 461.

tenance of peace and of the *status quo* in the Balkans. It divided this peninsula into two parts, each of which in turn was subdivided into a sphere of immediate interests and a sphere of secondary interests for each contractant. Serbia constituted the sphere of immediate Austro-Hungarian interests; Bulgaria that of immediate Russian interests. Macedonia up to Saloniki and Albania—with the exception of certain districts southeast of the Montenegrin frontier—became the zone of secondary Austro-Hungarian interests, while for Russia this zone comprised the eastern part of the Balkan peninsula. The two signatory states engaged, each in the radius of influence thus assigned to it, to look after the maintenance of peace. If Serbia or Bulgaria provoked complications, the power whose interests were affected would have a separate right of armed intervention. The text was to be communicated to Germany entire; to Italy with the exception of the passage concerning Albania.¹

This agreement was supplemented later, as appears from a letter of the Tsar to the Kaiser of November 23, 1904:

Hearing that the Emperor of Austria has written to you about an arrangement signed between Russia and Austria, I think it my duty to inform you also from my side. Wishing to strengthen our efforts in keeping peace and tranquillity in the Balkan affairs according to the agreement of 1897, the Emperor and I resolved to sign a secret declaration for the observation of a loyal and strict neutrality in case one of the Empires should be in a state of war, alone and without provocation on its part, with a third country, the latter wishing to endanger the existing *status quo*. Naturally this declaration does not concern any small Balkan country, and it will last as long as Russia and Austria continue their policy of peace in Southeastern Europe.²

The understanding affected Balkan affairs much longer than the five years during which it was known contemporaneously to exist. For instance, there is an indication in the documents published by the Bolshevik régime at Petrograd that it was in force 12 years later, and that it had consequently been prolonged by failure to denounce. A

¹ W. Beaumont, "La politique extérieure de l'Autriche-Hongrie," *Questions coloniales et diplomatiques*, V, 283-287; Elie de Cyon, *Les deux politiques russes* (Paris, La Nouvelle revue, 1898), 13. The existence of a "treaty" was denied in explicit terms by Vienna, and a constructive denial built up by Russia. Later evidence, however, is conclusive that there was an *accord*, not unreasonably in the terms revealed by the *Frankfurter Zeitung*.

² The Willy-Nicky Correspondence, 84-85.

project of agreement between Russia and Germany proposing that Germany should associate herself with the Austro-Russian agreement of 1897 and guarantee that Austria-Hungary should refrain from all aggressive action in the Balkans was submitted to the Tsar in a memorandum by M. Charikov on May 4, 1909, according to a document printed in the Bulletin of the Soviets on November 25, 1917.¹

Another evidence of the persistent existence of the agreement of 1897 was given in 1910, when Austria-Hungary and Russia passed through one of the frequent minor crises which characterized European politics. The exchange of views was semi-hostile, both sides asserting a point of view which the other did not accept. Throughout, Russia endeavored to consider the Balkan problem as an international question, and Austria-Hungary tried to keep the discussion between the two powers. Count Aehrenthal, Austro-Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, on February 5, 1910, suggested that the necessary contact for re-establishing an exchange of views would appear to be most easy "since the cabinet of Vienna maintains always the principles laid down in the agreement of 1897 which permit it at all times to enter into conversation with the St. Petersburg cabinet." M. Izvolski, the Russian foreign minister, considered that the exchange "could not have the character of the agreement of 1897 and must on the other hand be given a form which would permit associating all the interested powers in it." Russia proposed a start from the following points, "which must be brought to the knowledge of the other powers: 1. Maintenance of the *status quo* in the Balkan peninsula; 2. The new Turkish régime being based on equality of rights for all populations, maintenance and consolidation of the order of things; 3. Independence, consolidation and pacific development of the small Balkan states."

Austria-Hungary replied on February 20 in an aide-mémoire. She "had not thought to revive by the present *pourparlers* the agreement of 1897." In Vienna's opinion, "nothing at present threatens to rupture the *status quo* in the Balkans;" while not opposing a communication to the powers in a form permitting their participation,

¹London Times, November 28, 1917, page 5. The documents published by the Bolsheviks in November and December, 1917, were distributed between the *Izvestiya* of the Soviets and the *Pravda*, the Bolshevik organ.

"it at present is sufficient to publish" the *communiqué* of the two Governments, "giving mutual recognition to the principles of their policy," which "permit them to enter into relations at any time." Russia on February 24 expressed the opinion that a "simple *communiqué* in the form proposed by the cabinet of Vienna would not be sufficient." Russia renewed the proposal to inform the other states of the points on which the two cabinets were in agreement, "so that, if events menaced the *status quo*, an exchange of views could be promptly established among all the interested powers." Austria-Hungary objected on March 14 that an official communication of the results of the exchange to the powers "would give a basis for supposing that a formal agreement exists between Russia and Austria-Hungary, which does not enter into the views of the Vienna cabinet." On March 20 M. Izvolski telegraphed that he intended to inform the powers of results obtained in the *pourparlers* and to communicate the correspondence. This was done on that day and the following *communiqué* issued:

The recent negotiations between the cabinets of St. Petersburg and Vienna have attained a satisfactory result. This exchange of views having shown that in the field of Balkan affairs there was between Russia and Austria-Hungary an entire conformity of political principles, the normal diplomatic relations between the two Governments have been re-established.

The three points thus being placed on an international basis, Austria-Hungary made the best of its attempt to avoid that obligation in a *communiqué* of March 21 in which it insisted that "the intention of concluding a formal agreement" had not "for a moment" arisen; that "there was no need to make to the powers a communication on the *pourparlers*"; and that, "the known principles of Austro-Hungarian policy in the Balkans" remaining the same, there was "therefore no new fact to furnish a motive for" the present communication.¹

¹ *Archives diplomatiques*, CXIII, 425-429. See also two articles by Jacques Docobantz, "Les conversations austro-russes" and "Les communiqués austro-russes," *Questions coloniales et diplomatiques*, XXIX, 329-337, 403-8.

FRANCE AND ITALY COMPOSE MEDITERRANEAN RIVALRY

France and Italy in February, 1902, before the renewal of the Triple Alliance in that year, reached their arrangement respecting the Mediterranean.¹ With France a growing and successful colonizing power on the littoral of the Middle Sea, with possessions adjoining both Tripoli—on which Italy had her eye—and Morocco—of which she had some hopes—, it was natural that the policy of the two Latin states should be potentially antagonistic. Nevertheless, their foreign offices had long been in close relations and each appreciated the value of the other's friendship. Primarily, also, France was ready to forego her possibility of eventually keeping Italy from acquiring Tripoli if the Consultá would return the compliment respecting French ambitions in Morocco. So each refrained from making the other trouble in a field where it was little interested. Probably it was during these negotiations that France received assurances as to Italy's freedom under the terms of the Triple Alliance from any duty of menacing her. Said Théophile Delcassé, minister of foreign affairs, in the French Chamber of Deputies, July 3, 1902:

We concerned ourselves with the extent to which this diplomatic act corresponded with the relations of interests and friendship so opportunely resumed between France and Italy. Our preoccupation was natural; I hasten to add that it was not lengthy, the Government of the king having taken care itself to clear up and define the situation. And the declarations which have been made to us permit us to acquire the certainty that the policy of Italy as resulting from her alliances is neither directly nor indirectly directed against France; that it in no case involves a menace for us either under a diplomatic form or by virtue of protocols or international military provisions; and that in no case and in no form can Italy become either the instrument or the auxiliary of aggression against our country.²

The terms of the agreement of 1902 have not been published, but they were undoubtedly of the same tenor as the revision which took place at Paris on October 28, 1912, and which at that time was

¹ The agreement was signed by MM. Delcassé and Prinetti.

² *Journal Officiel, Chambre des députés, Débats parlementaires*, séance du 3 juillet 1902, 2081.

substantially repeated in an arrangement with Spain. The Franco-Italian declaration of 1912 read:

The Royal Government of Italy and the Government of the French Republic, desirous of executing in the most friendly spirit their agreements of 1902, confirm their mutual intention of reciprocally not bringing forward any obstacle to the realization of all measures they consider it opportune to take (*édicter*), Italy in Libya and France in Morocco.

They agree likewise that the most-favored-nation treatment shall be reciprocally assured to Italy in Morocco and to France in Libya: the said treatment being applicable in the largest sense to the nationals, products, establishments and enterprises of both states, without exception.¹

ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE TAKES FORM

After the lease of Port Arthur to Russia on April 9, 1898, Russia desired to connect the city with the Siberian railroad. For this purpose money was needed and Serge Witte, the Russian minister of finance, found the money markets of France and Germany tight at the time. "We must therefore seek a market for our national bonds in your country," he said to the British representative. "To make any issues a success we must first secure the goodwill of the British people. Russia is therefore planning to give your countrymen greater freedom to engage in the Russian coastal trade, to introduce British industries, and other commercial privileges." The plan, however, was not then carried out.²

In 1900 Count Tadasu Hayashi took up his post at London as Japanese minister. In the spring of 1901 Baron von Eckardstein, German chargé d'affaires at London, suggested to Minister Hayashi a triple alliance between Japan, Great Britain and Germany respecting affairs in the Far East. Hayashi reported the remark to Tokyo and was authorized on April 16 to sound the British Government on his own responsibility. The next day, during a discussion, Lord Lansdowne thought an Anglo-Japanese arrangement might be ad-

¹ *Rivista di diritto internazionale*, VII, 425-6 (1913) and *Revue de droit international public*, XX, Documents, 9. Italy signed the same text, *mutatis mutandis*, with Spain respecting the Spanish zone in Morocco on May 4, 1913.

² Andrew M. Pooley, "The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi" (New York, Putnam, 1915), 107-108.

visible. In a conversation on May 15 the matter was further discussed. On July 15 Sir Claude MacDonald, British minister at Tokyo, who had just had an audience of King Edward VII, called on Count Hayashi and stated that the King considered an Anglo-Japanese arrangement desirable. He expressed a fear that Japan might make an alliance with Russia respecting the Far East. "In fact the German ambassador has been to the Foreign Office and said that there was a possibility of such action on the side of Japan," said Sir Claude.¹

Other private conversations followed and on October 16 formal negotiations commenced. On November 13, 1901, Count Hayashi received telegraphic instructions to meet Marquis Hirobumi Ito at Paris and communicate to him all telegrams he had received. Ito was under tentative instructions to conclude a Russo-Japanese arrangement while in Europe. On learning of the progress made in the Anglo-Japanese negotiations Ito gave his approval and it was agreed that so long as negotiations were in progress at London no discussion of a convention should occur at St. Petersburg unless proposed by Russia.² On November 20 Great Britain indicated that Japanese negotiations with Russia during the *pourparlers* with Great Britain would displease the latter. In reply to Hayashi's report of this conversation the Tokyo foreign office, the Kanumigaseki, said that Japan had no intention of playing a double game and stated that Marquis Ito had no official mission to Russia.

Negotiations continued from that time on without interruption. The first Anglo-Japanese alliance was signed January 30, 1902, and was to last five years. However, the Russo-Japanese war began on February 8, 1904, and the next summer a correspondence obviously intended to put Russia at odds with Great Britain was initiated by the Kaiser with the Tsar. On October 27 the Kaiser, criticizing the quality of British neutrality, spoke of a new danger which "would have to be faced in community by Russia and Germany together." The next day the Tsar wrote that "the only way, as you say, would be that Germany, Russia and France should at once unite upon an arrangement to abolish Anglo-Japanese arrogance and insolence."³ Further discussion ensued and they actually signed a treaty August

¹ Pooley, *op. cit.*, 128.

² *Ibid.*, 149-150.

³ Herman Bernstein, *The Willy-Nicky Correspondence*, 68, 74-75.

24, 1905.¹ But on August 12, 1905, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was renewed in a form revised to include within its scope British India and the intervention of a third power in the current war, and the Russo-German rulers let their scheme fall into abeyance. The alliance was again revised July 13, 1911, on the initiative of Great Britain who at the time was about to sign a treaty with the United States providing for the peaceful settlement of all disputes. The alliance text of 1905 was so worded that, in the event of war between the United States and Japan, Great Britain might find it her duty to participate on the Nipponese side. It was a point of British honor to have no conflicting engagements, and her ally showed her own goodwill by readily consenting to the change.

ORIGIN OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE

Edward VII succeeded to the throne of the British Empire on January 22, 1901. A man of 69 years, he had long been a student of European affairs and was welcomed as one who would prove a tranquilizing influence among the powers. Even his nephew the Kaiser, who did not like him, wrote in a moment of candor that "Uncle Albert's . . . wish for peace is quite pronounced, and is the motive for his liking to offer his services wherever he sees collisions

¹ The text of the treaty as published in a correspondence dispatch of the Associated Press of February 28, 1918, read:

"POLYARNAYA ZVEZDA" (Polar Star),
"BJÖRKE, 24 August, 1905.

"Their Imperial Majesties, the Emperor of All Russia on the one hand and the Emperor of Germany on the other, with a view of insuring the peace of Europe, have agreed to the following points of a treaty regarding a defensive union:

"Point 1. Should either of these empires be attacked by any other European power the ally shall come to its aid in Europe with all its land and naval forces.

"Point 2. The contracting parties obligate themselves not to make a separate peace with the common enemy.

"Point 3. The present agreement shall come into force at the signing of a peace between Russia and Japan and shall remain in force until a period, the date of which shall be fixed upon a year in advance.

"Point 4. The Emperor of All Russia, on the coming into force of the above treaty, shall take necessary steps to inform France of said treaty and shall propose that France should join the same as an ally.

(Signed) "WILHELM,
"NICHOLAS.

(Countersigned) "VON TSCHIRSKY,
"BENKENDORF,
"A. BIRILEV."

The text was communicated to Serge Witte by the Tsar on the former's return from Portsmouth after the Russo-Japanese peace negotiations (Bernstein, Willy-Nicky Correspondence, 127-128). Witte himself stated to his friend B. Glinski, editor of the *Russkoye Slovo*: "It was I who was responsible for the annulment of the double treaty, for both offensive and defensive war, concluded between Nicholas II and Wilhelm at Björke." (See also Emile Joseph Dillon, *The Eclipse of Russia*, 312-370, 393-415.)

in the world.”¹ He therefore naturally threw his weight in favor of an Anglo-French cordial understanding.

An address advocating an arbitration treaty between France and Great Britain was delivered on March 27, 1901, by Thomas Barclay before the French Arbitration Society. Barclay forthwith organized and conducted an active propaganda for Anglo-French friendship which culminated in the signing of a general arbitration treaty on October 14, 1903.

Edward VII was a frequent visitor to Paris and did much to cultivate the friendly feeling which had thus been privately inspired. In May, 1903, he visited Paris in his official capacity and President Émile Loubet of France returned the courtesy on July 6-9. At that time the decision to negotiate a settlement of all outstanding frictional questions was decided upon by the ministers of foreign affairs of the two countries. The decision then taken had, however, been cultivated in diplomatic circles for several years. Pierre Paul Cambon had gone to London as French ambassador in 1898, and had had not a little to do with preparing the ground. “When my brother,” said Jules Martin Cambon, then French ambassador at Berlin, to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg on June 11, 1911, in urging a similar attitude on the part of Germany, “was appointed ambassador to London, the situation between France and England was very delicate; one morning by mutual agreement it was resolved to examine the difficulties which divided the two countries, to take account of the legitimate grievances of both; they were discussed in good faith, and the *entente cordiale* resulted from that.”²

The negotiations begun in July, 1903, were concluded by the series of documents signed on April 8, 1904.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION RESPECTING ASIA

Great Britain continued the effort to improve political conditions, turning to Russia with whom relations in Asia had proverbially been difficult. The spirit behind the ensuing negotiations was well expressed by Baron Greindl, Belgian minister at Berlin, in a letter to

¹ Bernstein, *The Willy-Nicky Correspondence*, 47.

² Ministère des affaires étrangères. *Documents diplomatiques*, 1912. *Affaires du Maroc*, VI, page 350.

M. Davignon, his minister for foreign affairs, June 22, 1907, when he wrote:

International understandings are the fashion. After the Franco-Russian alliance we had the understanding of Italy with France and England on the Mediterranean, the alliance between England and Japan, and finally the agreement between England and France by which they settled their bargain over Egypt and Morocco. At present England is negotiating with Russia concerning the regulation of boundaries and spheres of influence in Asia. All these understandings arose either from a desire to put an end to old differences or to prevent new ones from arising. . . .

The resulting treaty, signed August 31, 1907, left three great countries without mutual suspicions regarding each other.¹ The effort at appeasement continued. Parliamentary and commercial visits were exchanged, and Anglo-Russian friendship became a subject for sympathetic public discussion. All of this attained a new significance when King Edward visited the Czar at Reval on a yachting cruise, June 9-11, 1908. Exchange of courtesies was from ship to ship and the occasion was interesting because it was the first time in history that the standards of Russia and Great Britain floated from one masthead. The toasts delivered at the exchange of visits on June 9 included the following words:

The Tsar: . . . I trust that this meeting, while strengthening the many and strong ties which unite our houses, will have the happy result of drawing our countries closer together and of promoting and maintaining the peace of the world. In the course of the past year several questions of equal moment both to Russia and to England have been satisfactorily settled by our Governments. I am certain that your Majesty appreciates as highly as I do the value of these agreements, for, notwithstanding their limited scope, they cannot but help to spread among our two countries feelings of mutual goodwill and confidence. . . .

¹ The value of the convention from this point of view was discussed by Sir Edward Grey in Parliament, July 10, 1912, when he said: "But for that agreement Russia would have been constantly under the misapprehension that we in southern Persia were going to take advantage of the chaos and the situation to prejudice her interests and the old state of suspicion, of intrigue and squabble, which used to exist between Great Britain and Russia, would have been intensified many fold under the present condition of affairs. Instead of that, however much we may differ as to the merits of the agreement, there has never been for a moment any suspicion on either side that either Russia or Great Britain has been attempting to exploit the situation in Persia to the disadvantage of the other. The fact that that has been so has not only been in the interest of the two countries, but has also been in the interests of peace."—(Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, House of Commons, XL, 1982-1983.)

The King: . . . I most heartily indorse every word that fell from your Majesty's lips with regard to the convention recently concluded between our two Governments. I believe it will serve to knit more closely the bonds that unite the peoples of our two countries, and I am certain that it will conduce to the satisfactory settlement in an amicable manner of some momentous questions in the future. I am convinced that it will not only tend to draw our two countries more closely together, but will help very greatly toward the maintenance of the general peace of the world.¹ . . .

HOW THE TRIPLE ENTENTE RIPENED

M. Izvolski, Russian minister of foreign affairs, had an audience of King Edward, August 21, 1908.² At that time the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress had just thrown Abd ul Hamid out of power and restored the constitution of 1876. On October 1, Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria declared his independence of Turkey and assumed the title of Tsar of the Bulgars. On October 3, the monarch of Austria-Hungary proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkish provinces up till then occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary by virtue of Art. 25 of the treaty of Berlin. These events created the Balkan crisis of 1908-9 in which the German Kaiser a year later said that he stood "by the side of his ally in shining armor." Before he assumed the posture M. Izvolski had a second audience of King Edward on October 11, 1908.³ During the crisis, which lasted until the next May—a period of six months in which Germany kept her armor shining and Austria-Hungary brandished her mailed fist in the face of the Balkans—France, Great Britain and Russia were a unit in upholding the public law of Europe. Though for technical reasons not unconnected with the German attitude, the idea of a conference to revise the treaty of Berlin was abandoned, they were consistent and successful in applying the principle established by the treaty of London of March 13, 1871. This treaty was brought about by a Russian unilateral denunciation of three articles of the treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856, and was negotiated as a result of a declaration of the conference on January 17, 1871, in which it was

¹ *London Times*, Weekly Edition, June 12, 1908, page 376.

² *Ibid.*, August 28, 1908, 555.

³ *Ibid.*, October 16, 1908, 664.

recognized "that it is an essential principle of the law of nations that no power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty, nor modify the provisions thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting powers by means of an amicable arrangement." Owing to the stand taken by France, Great Britain and Russia, with the assistance of Italy, but on the initiative of the British Government, Art. 25 and six paragraphs (5, 7-11) of Art. 29 of the treaty of Berlin were abrogated and a revision substituted for the sixth paragraph of Art. 29.¹ The phrase, the Triple Entente, referring to France, Great Britain and Russia as a triumvirate aiming at the maintenance of peace, became current immediately these facts were public property.

No formal document established the Triple Entente, but it probably gained strength from that circumstance. Numerous evidences of close relations between the three governments constantly came to public attention. Of the more formal of these the following farewell to England issued by the Tsar after his visit to the British King at the Cowes regatta, August 2-5, 1909, may be cited:

The Emperor is deeply impressed by his visit to this country. The affectionate welcome accorded to him and the Empress by the Royal family, the reception given by the magnificent naval force which saluted him at Cowes, the attitude of British statesmen, people and press, are all happy auguries for the future. It is the Emperor's firm desire and belief that this all too brief visit can only bear the happiest fruit in promoting the friendliest feeling between the Governments and peoples of the two countries.²

EFFECTS OF THE AGADIR CRISIS

Triple entente friendliness and co-operation grew as occasion occurred in the complicated web of European politics. The Agadir crisis, precipitated on July 1, 1911, by Germany's sending the warship *Panther* to that Moroccan Atlantic port, created a situation of great tension during that summer, and resulted in agreements between France and Germany signed November 4, 1911. Great Britain throughout supported in general the attitude of France and, with

¹ K. U. K. Ministerium des äussern. *Diplomatische aktenstücke betreffend Bosnien und die Herzegovina, Oktober 1908 bis Juni 1909*, Nos. 156, 162, 175, 177, 184, 192.

² London Times, Weekly Edition, Supplement, August 13, 1909, iii.

Russia, again proved the stanchness of the understanding between them. Reviewing the whole affair in an important speech in the House of Commons on the following November 27, Sir Edward Grey spoke particularly of France:

I trust that the fact that we have with France during the last seven years gone hand in hand through a great deal of rough diplomatic weather, without for a moment losing touch with each other, will have its influence in perpetuating in France and here confidence in our mutual good faith and good will, our intention to keep in touch.¹

It was typical of the closely organized political groups of the period that Anglo-French-Russian co-operation during such a crisis should have caused rumors of alliances about to be born from the *entente*. The British prime minister denied the existence of such formal arrangements on the same day Sir Edward Grey spoke, and also on December 6, in reply to a question by Gordon Harvey who "asked the prime minister if the fact that there is no secret arrangement of any sort or kind which has not been disclosed is applicable to treaties which exist between this country and powers other than France." Mr. Asquith said in reply:

As has been stated,² there were no secret engagements with France other than those that have now been published, and there are no secret engagements with any foreign Government that entail upon us any obligation to render military or naval assistance to any other power. There are none of them of recent date.³

NAVAL AND MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN THE ENTENTE

After the Agadir crisis had passed the Triple Entente was sure enough of itself to extend the scope of its protective measures. Germany was developing both her army and fleet beyond the necessities of defense, and in particular her sea forces reached a strength which disturbed the balance of naval power. Between friendly nations there constantly occur conversations of the most intimate and frank character respecting the conditions they might be called on jointly

¹ Parl., Deb., 5th Series, XXXII, 64-65.

² *Ibid.*, 107.

³ *Ibid.*, 1400.

to face. Undoubtedly the powers of the Triple Entente had previously adjusted their forces as a result of such conversations. After Agadir changes took place to meet the situation as it was.

The first document resulting from such exchanges of views was the agreement extending the Franco-Russian alliance to the naval forces of the two states, signed at Paris July 13, 1912, by Théophile Delcassé, French minister of marine, and Admiral Prince Lieven, chief of the Russian naval general staff. This technical agreement was not only a logical rounding-out of the alliance but a proper new development in view both of the importance of European navies and of the rebuilding of the Russian fleet.

During the same period Great Britain and France rearranged their fleets in order to distribute them more economically. Britain had previously maintained the two-power standard both in the Mediterranean and the North Sea. In recent years naval increases in Europe had centered in the northern waters by reason of Germany's building program. No one doubted that the German naval power was pointed at British supremacy. On the other hand, Franco-Italian relations were cordial and lacking in mutual suspicion. Without changing any political element of naval power, it was therefore possible for Great Britain to rely somewhat on French defense of her Mediterranean interests and to strengthen her North Sea fleet at the expense of her squadrons in the Middle Sea. This disposition of the fleets, Sir Edward Grey definitely stated, was "not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war."

Great Britain and France on November 22-23, 1912, by exchange of letters reached an understanding that they would examine together "the question whether both Governments should act together" in the event of either "having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third power, or some event threatening the general peace." These letters are considered as part of the Entente Cordiale and are printed below.

Use of British land forces is implied in the exchange of letters, if the Governments should decide on common action. Both Governments were entirely free to decide that question according to their own interests. This was made clear by Prime Minister Asquith on March 24, 1913, when he answered two questions in Parliament:

Sir William Byles asked the prime minister whether he will say if this country is under any, and, if so, what, obligation to France to send an armed force in certain contingencies to operate in Europe; and, if so, what are the limits of our agreements, whether by assurance or treaty with the French nation?

Joseph King asked the prime minister (1) whether the foreign policy of this country is at the present time unhampered by any treaties, agreements or obligations under which British military forces would, in certain eventualities, be called upon to be landed on the Continent and join in military operations; and (2) whether, in 1905, 1908 or 1911, this country spontaneously offered to France the assistance of a British army to be landed on the Continent to support France in the event of European hostilities?

The Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith): As has been repeatedly stated, this country is not under any obligation not public and known to Parliament which compels it to take part in any war. In other words, if war arises between European powers there are no unpublished agreements which will restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government or of Parliament to decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war. The use that would be made of the naval or military forces if the Government and Parliament decided to take part in a war is, for obvious reasons, not a matter about which public statements can be made beforehand.¹

If the Triple Entente had been aggressive in its nature naval and military conventions between Russia and Great Britain would have been negotiated. No suggestion of a military convention was made, and no naval agreement was concluded. This was very definitely stated by Sir Edward Grey in Parliament on June 11, 1914:

Joseph King asked whether any naval agreement has been recently entered into between Russia and Great Britain; and whether any negotiations, with a view to a naval agreement, have recently taken place or are now pending between Russia and Great Britain?

Sir William Byles asked the secretary of state for foreign affairs whether he can make any statement with regard to an alleged new naval agreement between Great Britain and Russia; how far such agreement would affect our relations with Germany; and will he lay papers?

Sir Edward Grey: The hon. member for North Somerset asked a similar question last year with regard to military forces, and the hon. member for North Salford asked a similar question also on the same day, as he has

¹ Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, House of Commons, L, 1316-1317.

again done to-day. The prime minister then replied that, if war arose between European powers, there were no unpublished agreements which would restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government or of Parliament to decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war. That answer covers both the questions on the paper. It remains as true to-day as it was a year ago. No negotiations have since been concluded with any power that would make the statement less true. No such negotiations are in progress, and none are likely to be entered upon so far as I can judge. But if any agreement were to be concluded that made it necessary to withdraw or modify the prime minister's statement of last year, which I have quoted, it ought, in my opinion, to be, and I suppose that it would be, laid before Parliament.¹

"TURNS OF THE ITALIAN WALTZ"

It would be unfair to Italy not to relate in this summary what have been called the "turns of the Italian waltz." By this term is meant the engagements or understandings on matters possibly within the scope of the Triple Alliance which Italy developed with countries outside the alliance. In reality, these were the only dependable efforts made on the part of its members to keep the political situation healthy in Europe. They were stabilizing in their effect, and it was noticeable that Italy's relations were usually better with her friends than with her allies. This condition was almost a permanent one in European politics, and was one of its important imponderables.

In October, 1891, M. Giers, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, had an interview with Marquis di Rudini, the Italian foreign minister, at Monza, where they found their policies were in no wise antagonistic.² At Milan in November an agreement was concluded "by which Russia probably consented to intervene with France under certain hypotheses in the Near East."³ Italy's previous agreement with Great Britain respecting the Mediterranean was thus supplemented, and five years later, on September 28, 1896, the question of Tunis, whose acquisition by France in 1881 had been a blow to Italian ambitions, was laid to rest between the two powers.

¹ Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, House of Commons, LXIII, 457-458.

² *London Times*, October 20, 1891, page 3; *Le Mémorial diplomatique*, 1891, 660, 676, 678.

³ Albin, *La Guerre allemande. D'Agadir à Serajevo*, 231.

On that date three conventions relating to commerce, navigation, consular rights and privileges, establishment and extradition and applicable solely to Tunisia were signed by France and Italy, all being ratified on January 23, 1897.¹ It is noteworthy that these, as well as the Franco-Italian agreement of 1902, all with states outside the Triple Alliance, proved permanent.

It was different with the separate arrangements with Austria-Hungary, as the sequel showed. In 1897 Austria-Hungary and Italy sought to settle their respective claims in Albania. Albin² cites the treaty of November 6, 1897, respecting Albania, signed by Count Agenor von Goluchowski for Austria-Hungary and by Count Emilio Visconti-Venosta and Marquis di Rudini for Italy. By it the contracting powers declared their respective territorial disinterestedness in Albania; declared in favor of the *status quo* (Ottoman sovereignty); guaranteed, if the *status quo* were altered, Albanian autonomy and independence, and that the territory should not fall under the sovereignty of a third power.

Yet in 1910 the situation remained so unsatisfactory that after an exchange of views only this indefinite *communiqué* was issued:

Count Aerenthal and Marquis di San Giuliano acquired the absolute conviction of concordance of ideas of Austria-Hungary and Italy on questions of the Orient and especially on the Turkish question, and that neither of the two powers pursues in the Orient particular purposes or seeks special advantages.³

Only a year later Italy was at war with Turkey and was being hard pressed by demands from the Ballhausplatz for compensation.

Before this occurred Italy had opportunity to learn the quality of Entente-cordiale diplomacy. On December 13, 1906, two agreements were signed at London between Great Britain, France and Italy respecting Abyssinia, whose proximity to Eritrea made it really within the Italian sphere of influence. One of these related to the

¹ De Clerq, *Les Traités de la France*, XX, 597-625; *Trattati, convenzioni*, etc., XIV, 309-350. The French position in Tunisia was subsequently recognized by declarations as follows: Russia and Switzerland, October 14, 1896; Germany, November 18, 1896; Belgium, January 2, 1897; Spain, January 12, 1897; Denmark, January 26, 1897; Netherlands, April 3, 1897; Sweden and Norway, May 5, 1897; Great Britain, September 18, 1897 (De Clerq, *loc. cit.*, 626-632).

² *La Guerre allemande. D'Agadir à Serajevo*, 229-230.

³ *Archives diplomatiques*, CXV, 381-382.

importation of arms and ammunition,¹ and the other confirmed Italy's special interests in the country by this provision:

Art. 1. France, Great Britain and Italy are in agreement to maintain the political and territorial *status quo* in Ethiopia as determined by the existing state of affairs. . . .²

THE WORLD'S OLDEST ALLIANCE

Great Britain and Portugal have been allies for 545 years. No political alignment can compare with it for permanence. Through the storms and stress of half a millennium these two nations have remained friends and at peace with each other "against all men that may live or die," despite causes of difference as numerous and many times as serious as those arising between any other nations. It would almost seem that the negotiators of the first alliance spoke only the literal truth in the treaty jargon of the time when they declared a perpetual friendship and league of pure affection.

A word as to the origin of this alliance, which, originating 119 years before Columbus discovered America, brought Portugal into the fight against Germany in 1916. When the alliance began it was in a different world from ours, a medieval world in which communities were the units. Twenty years before the present alliance was concluded there was signed at London, on October 20, 1353, a treaty of commerce between Edward III, king of England, and the merchants, mariners and marine companies of the maritime states and cities of Portugal, which was in reality an alliance and which is here rendered into English, it is believed, for the first time:

1. There shall be good understanding and firm alliance both by sea and land between the said contracting parties for 50 years reckoned from the date of this treaty.

2. In consequence whereof, the vassals of the king of England will not be injured nor maltreated, either in their persons or their ships, merchandise or other objects belonging to them, by the merchants and mariners or maritime companies of the cities of Lisbon and Oporto.

¹ 97 British and Foreign State Papers, 252-253; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXV, 561.

² 97 British and Foreign State Papers, 486-490; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3^e série, V, 733.

3. Likewise, merchants and companies of the said cities will not receive injury, vexation or prejudice in their persons, ships, merchandise or other objects from the mariners of England, Gascony, Ireland and Wales, nor from any subject of the king of England.

4. None of the populace or subjects of either party shall contract an alliance with the enemies, opponents or adversaries of the other, cause prejudice nor lend them aid or succor.¹

The circumstances which originated the alliance 20 years later were dynastic. Ferdinand I of Portugal after the death of Peter the Cruel of Castile in 1367 or 1368 pretended to the throne of that kingdom and from 1369 to 1371 was on that account at war with Henry II of Trastamara, who made good his claim to the kingdom. Ferdinand celebrated a treaty of league with the Moorish king of Granada against Henry, while the king of Aragon had recognized him by treaty as sovereign of Castile. Intending to make a new war against Henry, he wrote to the Duke of Lancaster, who had pretensions to the Castilian throne through his mother, inviting him to join the venture. A treaty of peace and alliance was celebrated at Braga in July, 1372, directed against Henry of Trastamara and Peter IV of Aragon. Ferdinand thereupon sought to use this treaty as a basis for a similar union with England, the Duke of Lancaster being the third son of Edward III. Accordingly, he issued full powers to negotiators on November 27, 1372, and the alliance was signed on June 16, 1373.²

¹ Visconde Manuel Francisco de Barros de Santarem, *Quadro elementar*, XIV, 40-41; Rymer's *Foedera*, V, 763.

² Santarem, *Quadro Elementar*, XIV, xlii-xlv.

APPENDIX.

A. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.

I. TREATY OF DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE BETWEEN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE, SIGNED AT VIENNA, OCTOBER 7, 1879.¹

Inasmuch as their Majesties the German Emperor, King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, must consider it their inalienable duty to provide for the security of their Empires and the peace of their subjects, under all circumstances;

Inasmuch as the two Sovereigns, as was the case under the former existing Treaty, will be enabled by the close union of the two Empires to fulfill this duty more easily and more efficaciously;

Inasmuch as, finally, an intimate co-operation of Germany and Austria-Hungary can menace no one, but is rather calculated to consolidate the peace of Europe on the terms established by the stipulation of Berlin (Treaty of Berlin of 1878);

Their Majesties the Emperor of Germany and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, while most solemnly promising never to allow their purely defensive agreement to develop an aggressive tendency in any direction, have determined to conclude an alliance of peace and mutual defense.

With this object their Majesties have named as their Plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the German Emperor, his Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Lieutenant-General Prince Henry VII of Reuss, etc.;

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, his Majesty's Privy Councillor, Minister of the Imperial House and for Foreign Affairs,

¹ 73 British and Foreign State Papers, 270. The original publication was in the *Berlin Official Gazette* of February 3, 1888, where it was prefaced with this note:

"The Governments of Germany and of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy have determined upon the publication of the Treaty concluded between them on October 7, 1879, in order to put an end to doubts which have been entertained in various quarters of its purely defensive character, and have been turned to account for various ends. The two allied Governments are guided in their policy by the endeavor to maintain peace and to guard, as far as possible, against its disturbance; they are convinced that by making the contents of their treaty of alliance generally known they will exclude all possibility of doubt on this point, and have therefore resolved to publish it."

"The text revealed is the early one."—Count Vincent Benedetti, *Studies in Diplomacy*, 124.

Lieutenant Field Marshal Julius Count Andrassy of Csik-Szent-Kiraly and Kraszna-Haka, etc.;

Who have this day at Vienna, after the exchange and mutual verification of one another's full powers, agreed as follows:

Art. I. Should, contrary to their hope, and against the loyal desire of the two high Contracting Parties, one of the two Empires be attacked by Russia, the high Contracting Parties are bound to come to the assistance one of the other with the whole war strength of their Empires, and accordingly only to conclude peace together and upon mutual agreement.

Art. II. Should one of the high Contracting Parties be attacked by another Power, the other high Contracting Party binds itself hereby, not only not to support the aggressor against its high ally, but to observe at least a benevolent neutral attitude toward its fellow Contracting Party.

Should, however, in such a case the attacking Power be supported by Russia, either by an active co-operation or by military measures which constitute a menace to the Party attacked, then the obligation stipulated in Art. I of this Treaty for mutual assistance with the whole fighting force, becomes equally operative, and the conduct of the war by the two high Contracting Parties shall in this case also be in common until the conclusion of a common peace.

Art. III. This Treaty shall, in conformity with its peaceful character, and to avoid any misinterpretations, be kept secret by the two high Contracting Parties, and only be communicated to a third Power upon a joint understanding between the two Parties, and according to the terms of a special agreement.¹

The two high Contracting Parties venture to hope after the sentiments expressed by the Emperor Alexander at the meeting at Alexandrovo, that the armaments of Russia will not in reality prove to be menacing to them, and have on that account no reason for making a communication; should, however, this hope, contrary to their expectation, prove to be erroneous, the two high Contracting Parties would consider it their loyal obligation to let the Emperor Alexander know, at least confidentially, that they must consider an attack on either of them as directed against both.

In virtue of which the Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty and affixed their seals.

VIENNA, October 7, 1879.

H. VII, P. Reuss.
Andrassy.

¹ Bismarck read the treaty, which was renewed for five years in 1884, to Count Shuvalov on May 11, 1887. (Serge Goriainov, *American Historical Review*, XXIII, 335.)

2-4. MAIN TREATY OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE, AS REVISED IN 1903.¹

(EXCERPTS.)

Art. I. The high contracting parties mutually promise peace and friendship, and shall not enter into any alliance or engagement directed against any one of their respective States.

They bind themselves to proceed to negotiations on such political and economic questions of a general nature as may arise; and, moreover, promise their mutual support within the scope of their own interests.

Art. III. If one or two of the high contracting parties should be attacked without direct provocation on their part, and be engaged in war with two or several great powers not signatory to this treaty, the *casus fœderis* shall apply simultaneously to all the high contracting parties.²

Art. IV. In the event that a great power not signatory to this treaty should menace the safety of the states of one of the high contracting parties, and that the menaced party should be forced to make war on that power, the two others bind themselves to observe toward their ally a benevolent neutrality. Each one of them in that case reserves to herself the right to participate in the war, if she should consider it appropriate to make common cause with her ally.²

Art. VII. Austria-Hungary and Italy, being desirous solely that the territorial *status quo* in the near East be maintained as much as possible, pledge themselves to exert their influence to prevent all territorial modification which may prove detrimental to one or the other of the Powers signatory to this treaty. To that end they shall communicate to one another all such information as may be suitable for their mutual enlightenment, concerning their own dispositions as well as those of other Powers.

Should, however, the *status quo* in the regions of the Balkans, or of the Turkish coasts and islands in the Adriatic and Ægean Seas, in the course of events become impossible; and should Austria-Hungary or Italy be placed under the necessity, either by the action of a third power or otherwise, to modify that *status quo* by a temporary or permanent occupation on their part, such occupation shall take place only after a previous agreement has been made between the two powers, based on the principle of reciprocal compensation for all advantages, territorial or otherwise,

¹ Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Documents concerning the Relations of Austria-Hungary with Italy from July 20th, 1914, to May 23d, 1915 (Red Book), Appendices XV, XIV, XVI, I.

See pages 173-174 for list of original treaties.

² The wording for Arts. III and IV cannot have been quite the same [in the treaty of 1882].—Archibald Cary Coolidge, *The Origins of the Triple Alliance*, 222.

which either of them may obtain beyond the present *status quo*, a compensation which shall satisfy the legitimate interests and aspirations of both parties.¹

Art. —. One of the stipulations agreed to by all contracting parties was the observance of absolute secrecy. And this obligation was not confined to the terms of the alliance but extended to the fact that it had been concluded.²—Emile Joseph Dillon, *From the Triple to the Quadruple Alliance*, 30.

Art. —. [This treaty shall come into force from the date of its signing (?), and shall continue in force for five years.]³

5. MILITARY CONVENTIONS.

The treaty of alliance made its appearance with its train of extraordinary expenses [for Italy], the commixion of the German great general staff, the obligation of increasing the strength of the army and navy, of forming Alpine battalions, and of constructing strategical railways.—Count Vincent Benedetti, *Studies in Diplomacy*, 158–159.

Military conventions, already contained in principle in the diplomatic conventions, whose main lines were arranged by the general staffs of the three states and whose provisions were determined, it is believed, some time after the trip of Crispi to Friedrichsruhe in October, 1887.—Pierre Albin, *La Paix armée. L'Allemagne et la France en Europe (1885–1894)*, 332; citing Jens Julius Hansen, *Ambassade à Paris du Baron de Mohrenheim*, 93.

¹ The last part of Art. VII . . . was not in the original treaty. It was inserted in 1887, when the treaty was renewed for the first time.—Coolidge, *The Origins of the Triple Alliance*, 221–222.

² "But, as usual," Dillon continues, "the moment the Teutonic powers thought that their interests would be furthered by a breach of faith, they committed it. . . . In the Reichstag the Chancellor alluded to the treaty, and a few months later Count Kálnoky mentioned it at the Delegations in Budapest."

³ The statement given in brackets states a known fact. The periodicity has been the subject of much mis-statement. The accurate facts are important because of the connection of the renewal with the current political situation of the time. According to Count Benedetti, the alliance was renewed in 1883 (*Studies in Diplomacy*, 124), but this statement is apparently a misinterpretation owing to the fact that Rumania adhered to the alliance in that year, this naturally involving some technical change. The first regular renewal occurred February 19–20, 1887, and was for a period of five years. At that time one document was substituted for the two treaties originally signed in 1882. It was again renewed May 6, 1891, this time for twelve years, with the option of revision or denunciation at the end of six years. Its probable expiration at that time was May 22, 1892. On June 28, 1902,—or 23 months before the announced time of expiration,—it was renewed at Berlin by Chancellor von Bülow for Germany, Ambassador Szögyény for Austria-Hungary and Count Lanza for Italy. This renewal was for a period of 10 years, dating from 1903, with the option of revision or denunciation after five years. The last renewal occurred at Vienna on December 5, 1912, and was effected by Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian minister for foreign affairs, the Duke of Avarna, Italian ambassador, and Mr. von Tschirschky, German ambassador. It was effective for seven years, dating from 1913 (*La Tribuna*, cited *London Times*, December 10, 1912). The alliance would, then, as stated by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* on May 20, 1915 (quoted *New York Times*, June 9, 1915), have been effective until 1920. The treaty was denounced by Italy on May 4, 1915, and by Rumania, by declaration of war against Austria-Hungary, August 27, 1916.

In their original form [the military conventions between the general staffs] are understood to have provided for the passage of an Italian army corps into Germany in case of a war with France and for the immobilization of the French *Armée des Alpes* by the presence of an Italian army on the frontier of Savoy. On the renewal of the alliance in 1902, if not earlier, these dispositions are believed to have been abrogated.—*London Times*, December 9, 1912.

To prevent the trouble that would be inevitable if Rumanian troops marched with Hungarians, it was stipulated that in case of war Italy should send 40,000 men to fight beside the Rumanians.—Summary of interview with Take Ionescu by M. Tavernier, special correspondent of the *Paris Temps* at Bukharest, *New York Times*, September 21, 1916.

It is thanks to it [the alliance] that so many Rumanian officers have studied in Germany and Austria without any advantage to our arms. It is because of it that we have no artillery, infantry, mountain artillery, fortifications in the Carpathians or factories for munitions or guns.—Take Ionescu to M. Tavernier, special correspondent of the *Paris Temps* at Bukharest, quoted in *New York Times*, September 21, 1916.

6. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE SOVEREIGNS.

Verbal engagements passed between King Humbert and Emperor William and according to which these two monarchs engaged on their word of honor to remain faithful to the alliance and to bring pressure to bear on the resolutions of their ministers to prevent its being broken, if the case should arise. These confidential accords were communicated to the Emperor Francis Joseph who associated himself therewith, and this understanding, concluded in 1889, was intrusted to autograph letters which the three sovereigns exchanged. . . . Emperor Francis Joseph desired that the character of the alliance, as defined in the diplomatic provisions, should be synthesized in a concrete and explicit manner, and that it be well established that the agreement had a purely defensive objective, and that the *casus fœderis* would be produced only in case one of the three powers should be attacked and could not be invoked when one of them judged it expedient (*à propos*) to engage on its own account.—Jens Julius Hansen, *Ambassade à Paris du baron de Mohrenheim*, 91; quoted, Pierre Albin, *La Paix armée* . . . , 332.

7. INSTRUCTIONS OF COUNT GUICCARDINI TO THE DUKE OF AVARNA,
DECEMBER 15, 1909, HANDED BY THE LATTER TO COUNT AEHRENTHAL
ON DECEMBER 19, 1909.¹

In the conversations which have lately taken place between Count Aehrenthal and yourself with a view to specifying and perfecting Art. VII of the treaty of Triple Alliance, you have firstly agreed that, Austria-Hungary having renounced the rights which the treaty of Berlin had conferred upon her in respect of the Sandjak of Novibazar, the provisions of the aforesaid article of the treaty of Triple Alliance apply equally to the Sandjak as to other parts of the Ottoman Empire. If, therefore, Austria-Hungary, in consequence of the impossibility of maintaining the *status quo* in the Balkans, shall be compelled by force of circumstances to proceed to a temporary or permanent occupation of the Sandjak of Novibazar, that occupation shall only be effected after a previous agreement has been reached with Italy, based on the principle of compensation.

Faithful to the spirit which has inspired the treaty of Triple Alliance, and with a view to defining exactly and by mutual consent the mode of procedure which the two allied cabinets intend to adopt in certain eventualities, you have also arranged with Count Aehrenthal as follows:

Each of the two cabinets binds itself not to effect with a third power any agreement whatsoever concerning the Balkan question without the participation of the other cabinet on a footing of absolute equality. The two cabinets also bind themselves to communicate to one another all propositions which may be made to the one or to the other by a third power, contrary to the principle of non-intervention and referring to a modification of the *status quo* in the regions of the Balkans or of the Turkish coasts and islands in the Adriatic and Aegean Seas.

It is understood that Art. VII of the treaty of Triple Alliance, which is defined and completed only by the aforesaid provisions, shall remain in force in its entirety.

As to the duration of the obligations which the two cabinets assume by virtue of the aforesaid, it is understood that it shall coincide with that of the treaty of Triple Alliance, in such a manner that these obligations will be implicitly renewed with the renewal of the Triple Alliance.

Conforming with the analogous provisions of this treaty, the two cabinets mutually promise secrecy on the obligations thus entered into. Only the Berlin cabinet, in its capacity as an ally, shall be informed by the two Governments without delay.

¹ Austro-Hungarian Red Book, Appendix II.

In order to define exactly all that has been agreed upon in the conversations I have conducted through your mediation with the Austro-Hungarian Government, I request you to communicate this telegram to the minister of foreign affairs and to leave with him a copy thereof.

8. RELATIONS OF TURKEY TO THE ALLIANCE.

a. GERMAN ANNOUNCEMENT

- i. N. THEOTOKY, MINISTER OF GREECE AT BERLIN, TO KING CONSTANTINE.
(TELEGRAM.)

BERLIN, July 22/August 4, 1914.

His Majesty the Emperor of Germany has just telegraphed to me asking me to go immediately to him. As soon as I was ushered to his Majesty, he gave me to read a telegram which he had just received from your Majesty transmitted by the *chargé d'affaires* of Germany. His Majesty the Emperor asked me urgently to telegraph to your Majesty the following:

The Emperor informs your Majesty that an alliance was to-day¹ concluded between Germany and Turkey; that Bulgaria and Rumania are equally ranging themselves with Germany; that the German ships which are in the Mediterranean will be joined with the Turkish fleet in order to act together. From the above your Majesty will see that all the Balkan states have sided with Germany in the struggle which has been undertaken against Slavism.² . . .

- ii. N. THEOTOKY, MINISTER OF GREECE AT BERLIN, TO KING CONSTANTINE.
(TELEGRAM.)

BERLIN, July 22/August 4, 1914.

After having seen the Emperor I had a long conversation with Von Jagow, who confirmed to me, most confidentially, the conclusion of an alliance between Turkey and Germany. The Turkish troops will be under the high command of the Sultan and the Turkish generals, but General Liman will

¹ According to statements made by a diplomat at Athens in November, 1914, to the correspondent of the *London Morning Post*, "Turkey was compelled to enter the war by a secret treaty made some years ago with Germany, whereby Turkey agreed to assist Germany if war was declared on Germany by Russia. In return Germany likewise agreed to assist Turkey if Russia declared war on Turkey. At the opening of the war Germany demanded Turkey's assistance, but the Turkish cabinet, which regarded such an act as suicidal, replied that Turkey would be unable to assist because she had no money, because the army was going through a period of reorganization and because the fleet was powerless to defend the capital. Germany answered these objections by sending money, men and ships, whereupon Turkey was compelled to enter the arena because of her solemn treaty obligations."

² No. 19, Greek White Book, American Journal of International Law, Supplement, XII, 115; French text, *Pages d'histoire—1914-1918*. XVIII: *Le livre blanc grec* (Paris, Librairie militaire Berger-Levrault, 1918), 49; *London Times*, Weekly Edition, August 31, 1917, page 710.

intervene in their direction. Bulgaria and Rumania will march on the side of Germany. Between Turkey and Bulgaria there exists a sure understanding, thanks to which these two countries could march against every state which does not follow the same policy.¹ . . .

b. SYNOPSIS OF TURKO-GERMAN TREATY.

A news dispatch received here from Dedeagach, Bulgaria, says there has been made public there a synopsis of a treaty recently concluded between Germany and Turkey. This treaty provides that Germany shall furnish Turkey during the war with munitions, material and the money necessary for the Turkish Army, and supply also a sufficient number of German officers and specialists to meet Turkey's requirements. In case of victory Germany agrees to pay Turkey one-fifth of her war indemnity; in case of defeat Germany will introduce into the peace treaty a clause guaranteeing the integrity of Ottoman territory. Each country agrees not to conclude peace without the other. Turkey, under the terms of this agreement, is bound to make war against Great Britain and Russia. France is not mentioned in the document.—Associated Press dispatch, Paris, January 12, 1915.

9. TREATY BETWEEN BULGARIA AND GERMANY, AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND TURKEY CONCLUDED AT SOFIA, JULY 17, 1915.

The treaty provided for the cession to Bulgaria of the whole of Albania, and the new Serbian and Greek acquisitions in Macedonia, in return for Bulgarian participation in the war.

Patris of Athens stated that the secret treaty provides for the cession to Bulgaria of the whole of Albania, of the new Serbian territories, including Monastir, Ghevgeli, and Doïran; and of Greek Macedonia, including Saloniki, Kavalla, Seres, Drama and Castoria.

According to *Hestia*, the treaty was concluded during Prince Hohenlohe's visit to Sofia.—*London Times*, Weekly Edition, October 15, 1915, 870.²

¹ No. 20, Greek White Book, American Journal of International Law, Supplement, XII, 116; *Le livre blanc grec*, 50-51.

² Auguste Gauvain, *The Greek Question* (New York, American-Hellenic Society, 1918), 27, note. The Tsar's proclamation to his subjects stated: "The Central powers have promised us parts of Serbia, creating an Austro-Bulgarian border line which is absolutely necessary for Bulgaria's independence of the Serbians."—(*Frankfurter Zeitung*, quoted by Overseas News Agency dispatch in *Current History*, November, 1915, 220-221.)

"A treaty was signed between Bulgaria and Turkey in July, 1916, by which: "Bulgaria obtains the whole extent of the line traversing Turkish territory, together with the stations of Haragarh, Demotika and Kuleli Burgas. The Bulgarian frontier will coincide with the Maritsa, all territory west becoming Bulgarian."—(R. B. Mowat, *Select Treaties and Documents* . . . , 134, citing *London Times*, July 26, 1916.)

B. ALLIANCES OPPOSED TO THE CENTRAL POWERS.

I. FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE.

1. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS SIGNED BY ALEXANDER RIBOT, FRENCH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND BARON ARTHUR MOHRENSHEIM, RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE, AT PARIS, AUGUST 27, 1891.

The letters of August 27, 1891,¹ do not constitute an alliance properly speaking, but a pact *sui generis* containing the germs of more precise understandings which later events or a clearer foreseeing of the future may commend to the two contracting powers.

This pact rests upon a basis and involves an engagement:

The basis—or, if one wishes, the point of departure—is the recognition by France and Russia of their common interest in the maintenance of the general peace by the maintenance of a certain state of equilibrium in Europe;

The engagement—or, if one wishes, the point of arrival, the purpose of the contract—is the reciprocal provision which imposes on each of the contractants the obligation of concerting with the other for safeguarding that common interest, each time that any power or any group of powers in Europe threatens to injure it.—Pierre Albin, *La paix armée. L'Allemagne et la France en Europe (1885-1894)*, 322.

2. MILITARY CONVENTION SIGNED BY GENERAL LE MOUTON DE BOISDEFFRE, FRENCH ASSISTANT CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, AND GENERAL OBRUCHEV, RUSSIAN CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, AT ST. PETERSBURG, AUGUST, 1892.

The military convention of 1892 determines the technical conditions of the material collaboration foreseen.—Pierre Albin, *La paix armée. L'Allemagne et la France en Europe (1885-1894)*, 377.

The Russian army must be organized, both as to its distribution in time of peace and as to its mobilization and concentration, in such a manner

¹ Albin gives the date usually as August 22, but Freycinet, the premier at the time, in his *Souvenirs*, cites it as August 27.

that it would be in a position to draw to it, and then to combat, a certain part of the German army.

The details of this organization and these plans of mobilization could not, it is hardly necessary to say, be arranged once for all. The German army was indeed likely to undergo in its turn changes or even only increases which would call for other changes or increases in France or Russia. It was therefore only a question of laying down certain principles, to fix certain proportions between the armies of the two contracting countries and the German army, and then to admit the necessity of plans for mobilization arranged with certain hypotheses in view.—Pierre Albin, *op. cit.*, 348.

3. AGREEMENT OF ALLIANCE SIGNED BY NIKOLAI KARLOVICH GIERS, RUSSIAN MINISTER OF STATE, AND JEAN CASIMIR-PÉRIER, FRENCH PREMIER AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AT PARIS, MARCH, 1894.

The Franco-Russian alliance . . . may be defined in summary and approximately as:

A contract by virtue of which France and Russia, recognizing their common interest in the maintenance of peace and European equilibrium, engage first to associate themselves for the maintenance of this state of peace and equilibrium (agreement of 1891), and further to unite their forces to re-establish this state of peace and equilibrium, in case a third power should undertake to destroy it by an aggression against one of the contractants (agreement of 1894).—Pierre Albin, *La paix armée. L'Allemagne et la France en Europe (1885-1894)*, 377.

"At the request of the Tsar the agreements . . . were to remain secret." —Jens Julius Hansen, *L'Alliance franco-russe*, 121.

4. NAVAL CONVENTION SIGNED BY THÉOPHILE DELCASSÉ, FRENCH MINISTER OF MARINE, AND ADMIRAL PRINCE LIEVEN, RUSSIAN NAVAL CHIEF OF STAFF, AT PARIS, JULY 13, 1912.

The text of the naval convention is discussed in the *London Times*, Weekly Edition, August 2, 1912, 605; August 9, 1912, 622; August 16, 1912, 641.

II. ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE CORDIALE.

SCHEDULE OF DOCUMENTS.

The Entente Cordiale consisted of the following treaties:

1. Convention between Great Britain and France respecting Newfoundland and West and Central Africa, signed at London, April 8, 1904. (Ratifications exchanged at London, December 8, 1904.)¹
2. Declaration between Great Britain and France respecting Egypt and Morocco, signed at London, April 8, 1904, and secret articles of even date.²
3. Declaration between Great Britain and France concerning Siam, Madagascar and the New Hebrides, signed at London, April 8, 1904.³
4. Convention between Great Britain and France confirming the protocol signed at London on February 27, 1906, concerning the New Hebrides, signed at London, October 20, 1906. (Ratifications exchanged at London, January 9, 1907.)⁴

The condominium in the New Hebrides is a most enlightening example of international administration and it is planned to devote a subsequent number of a League of Nations to its operation.

¹ 97 British and Foreign State Papers, 31-38; Treaty Series, No. 5 (1905); Parl., Pap., 1905, CIII, 265; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXII, 29-37; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, I, 9-13.

The convention was completed by the following:

Agreement between Great Britain and France relative to the arbitral tribunal and the inquiries into the claims for indemnity contemplated by Art. III of the Convention of April 8, 1904, respecting Newfoundland, signed at London, April 7, 1905. (98 British and Foreign State Papers, 49-51; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXV, 363-366.)

French decree attacking the Iles de Los to the Government of French West Africa, Paris, July 4, 1905. (98 British and Foreign State Papers, 859.)

Convention between Great Britain and France respecting the delimitation of the frontier between the British and French possessions east of the Niger (confirming protocol of April 9, 1906), signed at London, May 29, 1906. [In fulfilment of article VIII, pars. 6 and 7 of the convention of 1904.] (Ratifications exchanged at London August 29, 1906.) (99 British and Foreign State Papers, 194-202; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXV, 463.)

Agreement between the United Kingdom and France respecting the delimitation of the frontier between the British and French possessions east of the Niger, signed at London, February 19, 1910. (Treaty Series, No. 1, 1912, Cd. 6013; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3^e série, VII, 362.)

² 97 British and Foreign State Papers, 39-53; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXII, 15-19; Treaty Series, No. 6, 1905; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, I, 6-8.

³ 97 British and Foreign State Papers, 53-55; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXII, 37-43; Treaty Series, No. 7, 1905.

⁴ 99 British and Foreign State Papers, 229-252; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3^e série, I, 523-564; Treaty Series, No. 3, 1907; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, I, 179-200.

The convention was completed and rendered operative by:

Exchange of notes between Great Britain and France. Arrangements under the convention of October 20, 1906, respecting the New Hebrides, signed at London, August 29, 1907. (100 British and Foreign State Papers, 499-536; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3^e série, I, 564-589.)

British order in council making further provision for the exercise of His Majesty's jurisdiction within the New Hebrides, London, October 24, 1911. (104 British and Foreign State Papers, 113.)

2. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS.

Owing to their ready accessibility, their length and technical character, official summaries of the contents and purport of the documents is substituted for the texts:

- a. CIRCULAR ADDRESSED APRIL 12, 1904, BY M. DELCASSÉ, FRENCH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO FRENCH AMBASSADORS AT BERLIN, BERN, CONSTANTINOPLE, MADRID, ST. PETERSBURG, VIENNA, WASHINGTON, NEAR THE KING OF ITALY, NEAR THE HOLY SEE, THE MINISTER AT TANGIER AND THE DIPLOMATIC AGENT AND CONSUL GENERAL AT CAIRO.¹

PARIS, April 12, 1904.

The great interests both moral and material connected with the understanding of England and France called for a friendly regulation of the questions which divided the two countries and from which in certain circumstances a conflict might result. At London as at Paris, the Governments were aware of that. The visits exchanged last year between King Edward and the President of the Republic showed that opinion on both sides of the Channel was favorably disposed.

In the course of the interview which I had the honor of having with Lord Lansdowne on July 7, 1903, the eminent secretary of state for foreign affairs and I examined successively all the problems which were placed before us. It was recognized that it was not impossible to find for each of them a solution equally advantageous to both parties.

Our common efforts, which have not ceased to be directed by a spirit of conciliation, resulted in the agreements of April 8, the authentic texts of which I send you annexed, adding some explanations on their nature and import.

The affairs of Newfoundland were among those which, after numerous attempts, had given place to discussions more and more delicate [*épineuses*]. The origin was far in the past. Art. 13 of the treaty of Utrecht [1713] abandoned to Great Britain Newfoundland and the adjacent islands. It was now only on the western and a part of the eastern coasts that we could come to take and dry fish, and only during the customary fishing season. Every permanent [*sédentaire*] establishment was prohibited to us. . . .

¹ De Clerq, *Recueil des traités de la France*, XXII, 525-536; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXII, 43-57.

It is seen that, to avoid risks of conflict which threatened to become disquieting, we only abandoned in Newfoundland privileges defendable with difficulty and hardly necessary [drying of fish on the coast], while keeping the essential, that is, fishing in territorial waters, and for the future throwing out of any possible dispute a precious right, fishing freely, or of buying bait for codfish on the whole extent of the French Shore. These compensations are, however, not the only ones to which we have consented.

We received others in West Africa of an importance very considerable for the development of our colonial empire. The concessions of England related to three places: Gambia, Los Islands and the region between the Niger and the Tchad.

The river Gambia constitutes sort of a happy anomaly in the hydro-graphic régime of the West African coast. When most of the water courses are almost impracticable for part of the year the Gambia, for a distance of 300 kilometers as the crow flies from its mouth, is navigable for seagoing vessels. It is one of the principal waterways in this region; we were excluded from it up to now. . . . It is open to us to-day. . . .

The Los Islands (formerly the Idolo Islands), which England has just ceded to us, are six in number, three of them large. . . . Situated less than five kilometers from the coast, in front of the recently built port of Konakry, the capital of French Guinea, this group commands immediate access to it. . . . We have built at Konakry a port which, if the future responds to what results already realized seem to promise, will be one of the great commercial entrepôts of this coast. The key of this port is since yesterday in our hands.

An important part of the arrangement just signed is devoted to the regions between the Niger and the Tchad. It was no less a question than the alteration or, better, a transformation to our great advantage, of the whole of the frontier determined by the convention of June 14, 1898. . . . The desert separated our possessions in the Sudan from those on the Tchad and by a combination of unforeseen circumstances the homogeneity of our African empire, so long sought, was not obtained. . . . Our communications by boat between the rivers of the north and south were impossible without passing through British waters. . . . In equity we needed a route, and we have obtained it. In law, however, that was not at all obligatory. . . .

The capital part of the arrangement just concluded relates to Morocco. Of all questions affecting the interests of France, none in fact has an importance comparable with that of Morocco; and it is evident that on its solution depended the solidity and the development of our African empire

and even the future of our situation in the Mediterranean. . . . In obtaining from England, whose strong position in Moroccan ports is known, the declaration that it belongs to France to look after the tranquility of this country and to lend its aid for all needed administrative, economic, financial and military reforms, as well as the engagement not to hinder her action to this end, we have attained a result whose value it is superfluous to emphasize. . . .

As concerns Egypt, you will note that the political condition is subjected to no change. The principal interest in the negotiation just completed is financial. A great part of the Egyptian debt is placed in France. It was a question of assuring our holdings the largest guaranties, while adapting them to the new conditions resulting from the financial resurrection of Egypt.

The defense of our own interests has not diverted our attention from a final question of general purport, even universal since it concerns the entire world, that of the free use of the Suez Canal. Remaining faithful to her traditions, the Government of the Republic was fortunate in being able to bring the British Government to engage to maintain in its entirety the freedom of one of the most important routes of international traffic. It must record with a particular satisfaction the adhesion of Great Britain to putting into force the treaty of October 29, 1888.

By the terms of the declaration of London of January 15, 1896, France and Great Britain had in a way neutralized the central provinces of Siam. . . . They engaged to acquire no privilege or particular advantage of which the benefit was not common to the two signatories. They further engaged to enter into no separate arrangement which permitted a third power to do what they reciprocally forbade themselves by this declaration. All these provisions had a rather negative character. The arrangement just concluded with the London cabinet, while maintaining the clauses which precede for those territories, establishes that the Siamese possessions situated east and southeast of this zone and the adjacent islands shall henceforth be considered amenable to French influence, while the regions situated to the west of the same zone and of the Gulf of Siam shall be amenable to English influence. While repudiating the idea of annexing any Siamese territory and engaging strictly to respect the existing treaties, the two Governments agree, regarding each other, that their respective action shall be freely exercised in each of the spheres of influence thus determined, which gives a practical bearing to the new agreement.

The special situation of the New Hebrides had given room for disputes touching the validity of acquisitions of land either by British subjects or

French citizens. The absence of any jurisdiction in these islands rendered insoluble the differences arising on this matter. It has been agreed that an arrangement shall be concluded to put an end to these difficulties.

Finally the two powers have profited by the negotiations under way to regularize the situation of Great Britain in Zanzibar and that of France in Madagascar. This was to put an end to embarrassing claims which, for many years, had hampered our action in the great island of the Indian Ocean.

Thus, thanks to a mutual good will, we managed to regulate the various questions which for a long time weighed on the relations of France and England. The first expressions of opinion abroad show the great importance attached to this settlement and that it is considered as a precious further guaranty for general peace. Moreover, the favorable appreciations of which these arrangements are also the subject in England and in France indicate sufficiently that they safeguard fully the essential interests of each, a condition necessary for a durable and fruitful understanding.

DELCASSÉ.

b. DISPATCH TO HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT PARIS FORWARDING AGREEMENTS WITH GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE OF 18TH APRIL, 1904.¹

FOREIGN OFFICE,
April 8, 1904.

(EXTRACT.)

After giving an analytical account of the agreements similar to the French summary and stating that they were believed to be desirable "if considered by themselves and on their intrinsic merits," the Marquess of Lansdowne wrote to Sir Edward Monson:

It is, however, important to regard them not merely as a series of separate transactions, but as forming a part of a comprehensive scheme for the improvement of the international relations of two great countries.

From this point of view their cumulative effect can scarcely fail to be advantageous in a very high degree. They remove the sources of long-standing differences, the existence of which has been a chronic addition to our diplomatic embarrassments and a standing menace to an international friendship which we have been at much pains to cultivate, and which, we rejoice to think, has completely over-shadowed the antipathies and suspicions of the past.

¹ Parl. Pap., 1904, CX 313 (Cd. 1952); *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXII, 1-15.

There is this further reason for mutual congratulations. Each of the parties has been able, without any material sacrifice of its own national interests, to make to the other concessions regarded, and rightly regarded, by the recipient as of the highest importance. . . . For these reasons it is fair to say that, as between Great Britain and France, the arrangement, taken as a whole, will be to the advantage of both parties.

Nor will it, we believe, be found less advantageous if it be regarded from the point of view of the relations of the two powers with the Governments of Egypt, Morocco and Siam. In each of these countries it is obviously desirable to put an end to a system under which the ruler has had to shape his course in deference to the divided counsels of two great European powers. Such a system leading, as it must, to intrigue, to attempts to play one power off against the other, and to undignified competition, can scarcely fail to sow the seeds of international discord, and to bring about a state of things disadvantageous and demoralizing alike to the tutelary powers, and to the weaker state which forms the object of their solicitude. Something will have been gained if the understanding happily arrived at between Great Britain and France should have the effect of bringing this condition of things to an end in regions where the interests of those two powers are specially involved. And it may, perhaps, be permitted to them to hope that, in thus basing the composition of long-standing differences upon mutual concessions, and in the frank recognition of each other's legitimate wants and aspirations, they may have afforded a precedent which will contribute something to the maintenance of international goodwill and the preservation of the general peace.

c. SECRET ARTICLES RESPECTING EGYPT AND MOROCCO SIGNED AT LONDON

APRIL 8, 1904.¹

(These articles are reprinted here because of their political importance.)

Art. 1.—In the event of either Government finding themselves constrained, by the force of circumstances, to modify their policy in respect to Egypt or Morocco, the engagements which they have undertaken toward

¹ 101 British and Foreign State Papers, 1053-1059; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3^e série, V, 664; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, VI, 26-30; Treaty Series, No. 24, 1911.

Spain made a declaration of adhesion to the whole declaration on October 3, 1904. (*Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXV, 666; 104 British and Foreign State Papers, 374; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, I, 8-9; and VI, 30.)

Simultaneous agreements were made between France and Spain, Great Britain and Spain at London May 16, 1907, for the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* of the three countries in the Mediterranean and in that part of the Atlantic Ocean which washes the shores of Europe and Africa. (American Journal of International Law, Supplement, VI, 425; 100 British and Foreign State Papers, 570-571; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXV, 692.)

each other by Articles 4, 6, and 7 of the Declaration¹ of to-day's date would remain intact.

Art. 2.—His Britannic Majesty's Government have no present intention of proposing to the Powers any changes in the system of the Capitulations, or in the judicial organization of Egypt.

In the event of their considering it desirable to introduce in Egypt reforms tending to assimilate the Egyptian legislative system to that in force in other civilized countries, the Government of the French Republic will not refuse to entertain any such proposals, on the understanding that his Britannic Majesty's Government will agree to entertain the suggestions that the Government of the French Republic may have to make to them with a view of introducing similar reforms in Morocco.

Art. 3.—The two Governments agree that a certain extent of Moorish territory adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta, and other *présides* should, whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it, come within the sphere of influence of Spain, and that the administration of the coast from Melilla as far as, but not including, the heights on the right bank of the Sebu shall be intrusted to Spain.

Nevertheless, Spain would previously have to give her formal assent to the provisions of Arts. 4 and 7 of the Declaration of to-day's date, and undertake to carry them out.

She would also have to undertake not to alienate the whole, or a part, of the territories placed under her authority or in her sphere of influence.

¹ The articles referred to read:

Art. 4.—The two Governments, being equally attached to the principle of commercial liberty both in Egypt and Morocco, declare that they will not, in those countries, countenance any inequality either in the imposition of customs duties or other taxes, or of railway transport charges.

The trade of both nations with Morocco and with Egypt shall enjoy the same treatment in transit through the French and British possessions in Africa. An agreement between the two Governments shall settle the conditions of such transit and shall determine the points of entry.

This mutual engagement shall be binding for a period of thirty years. Unless this stipulation is expressly denounced at least one year in advance, the period shall be extended for five years at a time.

Nevertheless, the Government of the French Republic reserve to themselves in Morocco, and His Britannic Majesty's Government reserve to themselves in Egypt, the right to see that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc., are only granted on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the State over these great undertakings of public interest.

Art. 6.—In order to insure the free passage of the Suez Canal, His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they adhere to the stipulations of the treaty of the 29th October, 1883 [for text see 70 B. and F. S. P., 18], and that they agree to their being put in force. The free passage of the Canal being thus guaranteed, the execution of the last sentence of Par. 1 as well as of Par. 2 of Art. VIII of that treaty will remain in abeyance.

Art. 7.—In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, the two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco comprised between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which command the right bank of the River Sebu.

This condition does not, however, apply to the places at present in the occupation of Spain on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean.

Art. 4.—If Spain, when invited to assent to the provisions of the preceding article, should think proper to decline, the arrangement between France and Great Britain, as embodied in the Declaration of to-day's date, would be none the less at once applicable.

Art. 5.—Should the consent of the other Powers to the draft Decree mentioned in Art. 1 of the Declaration of to-day's date not be obtained, the Government of the French Republic will not oppose the repayment at par of the Guaranteed, Privileged and Unified Debts [of Egypt] after the 15th July, 1910.

d. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS RESPECTING ARMED ASSISTANCE MADE BY SIR EDWARD GREY, BRITISH SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND PAUL CAMBON, FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO LONDON, NOVEMBER 22-23, 1912.¹

i. SIR EDWARD GREY TO M. CAMBON.

FOREIGN OFFICE,
November 22, 1912.

My dear Ambassador,

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If

¹ Inclosures Nos. 1 and 2 in dispatch No. 105, British Diplomatic Correspondence respecting the Outbreak of the European War.

these measures involved action, the plans of the general staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, etc.,

E. GREY.

ii. M. CAMBON TO SIR EDWARD GREY.

(TRANSLATION.)

FRENCH EMBASSY, LONDON,
November 23, 1912.

Dear Sir Edward,

You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorized to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common; if those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours etc.,

PAUL CAMBON.

III. ANGLO-RUSSIAN ENTENTE CORDIALE.

I. CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA RELATING TO PERSIA, AFGHANISTAN AND TIBET, SIGNED AT ST. PETERSBURG, AUGUST 31, 1907.¹ (RATIFICATIONS EXCHANGED AT ST. PETERSBURG, SEPTEMBER 23, 1907.)

No. 1.—SIR EDWARD GREY TO SIR ARTHUR NICOLSON.

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 29, 1907.

Sir,

I have to-day authorized your Excellency by telegraph to sign a convention with the Russian Government containing arrangements on the subject of Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet.

The arrangement respecting Persia is limited to the regions of that country touching the respective frontiers of Great Britain and Russia in Asia, and the Persian Gulf is not part of those regions, and is only part in Persian territory. It has not therefore been considered appropriate to introduce into the convention a positive declaration respecting special interests possessed by Great Britain in the Gulf, the result of British action in those waters for more than a hundred years.

His Majesty's Government have reason to believe that this question will not give rise to difficulties between the two Governments should developments arise which make further discussion affecting British interests in the Gulf necessary. For the Russian Government have in the course of the negotiations leading up to the conclusion of this arrangement explicitly stated that they do not deny the special interests of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf—a statement of which His Majesty's Government have formally taken note.

In order to make it quite clear that the present arrangement is not intended to affect the position in the Gulf, and does not imply any change of policy respecting it on the part of Great Britain, His Majesty's Government think it desirable to draw attention to previous declarations of British policy, and to reaffirm generally previous statements as to British interests in the Persian Gulf and the importance of maintaining them.

His Majesty's Government will continue to direct all their efforts to the

¹ 100 British and Foreign State Papers, 555-560; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, I, 398-406.

preservation of the *status quo* in the Gulf and the maintenance of British trade; in doing so, they have no desire to exclude the legitimate trade of any other Power.

I am, etc.,

(Signed) E. GREY.

No. 2.—SIR ARTHUR NICOLSON TO SIR EDWARD GREY.

ST. PETERSBURG, August 31, 1907.

Sir,

I have the honor to transmit herewith the convention which was signed to-day by M. Izvolski and myself for the settlement of certain questions affecting the interests of Great Britain and Russia in Asia.

I also beg leave to forward a note which I received from M. Izvolski in response to a communication from me, of which a copy is herewith inclosed, on the subject of the entry of scientific missions into Tibet.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

INCLOSURE 1 IN No. 2.—CONVENTION.

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, animated by the sincere desire to settle by mutual agreement different questions concerning the interests of their States on the Continent of Asia, have determined to conclude Agreements destined to prevent all cause of misunderstanding between Great Britain and Russia in regard to the questions referred to, and have nominated for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries, to wit:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the Right Honorable Sir Arthur Nicolson, His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Master of his Court Alexander Izvolski, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following:

ARRANGEMENT CONCERNING PERSIA.¹

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia having mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and sincerely desiring the preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful development, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the trade and industry of all other nations;

Considering that each of them has, for geographical and economic reasons, a special interest in the maintenance of peace and order in certain provinces of Persia adjoining, or in the neighborhood of, the Russian frontier on the one hand, and the frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the other hand; and being desirous of avoiding all cause of conflict between their respective interests in the above-mentioned provinces of Persia;

Have agreed on the following terms:

I.—Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favor of British subjects, or in favor of the subjects of third Powers, any concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.—beyond a line starting from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through, Isfahan, Yezd, Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar concessions in this region which are supported by the Russian Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Great Britain engages not to seek the concessions referred to.

II.—Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for herself and not to support, in favor of Russian subjects, or in favor of the subjects of third Powers, any concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.—beyond a line going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gazik, Birjand, Kerman, and ending at Bunder Abbas, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar concessions in this region which are supported by the British Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places

¹ Persia has informed Holland that it regards as null and void all treaties imposed on Persia in recent years, and especially the Russo-British treaty of 1907 regarding the spheres of influence in that country. The other treaties may be revised later, the communication from the Persian Government states, but that of 1907, with its appendices, is definitely annulled.—(Associated Press dispatch, May 3, 1918.)

The British secretary of state for foreign affairs, replying on May 13, 1918, to a parliamentary question, said: "We have informed the Persian Government that his Majesty's Government will be prepared to regard the 1907 convention, in so far as it applies to Persia, as being in suspense."

Persia was notified of the arrangement by a joint Anglo-Russian note of September 11, 1907 (102 British and Foreign State Papers, 906-907; see also 103 *ibid.*, 644-974).

are included in the region in which Russia engages not to seek the concessions referred to.

III.—Russia, on her part, engages not to oppose, without previous arrangement with Great Britain, the grant of any concessions whatever to British subjects in the regions of Persia situated between the lines mentioned in Arts. I and II.

Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement as regards the grant of concessions to Russian subjects in the same regions of Persia.

All concessions existing at present in the regions indicated in Arts. I and II are maintained.

IV.—It is understood that the revenues of all the Persian customs, with the exception of those of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, revenues guaranteeing the amortization and the interest of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the “Banque d’Escompte et des Prêts de Perse” up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement, shall be devoted to the same purpose as in the past.

It is equally understood that the revenues of the Persian customs of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, as well as those of the fisheries on the Persian shore of the Caspian Sea and those of the posts and telegraphs, shall be devoted, as in the past, to the service of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement.

V.—In the event of irregularities occurring in the amortization or the payment of the interest of the Persian loans concluded with the “Banque d’Escompte et des Prêts de Perse” and with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement, and in the event of the necessity arising for Russia to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the first-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Art. II of the present Arrangement, or for Great Britain to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the second-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Art. I of the present Arrangement, the British and Russian Governments undertake to enter beforehand into a friendly exchange of ideas with a view to determine, in agreement with each other, the measures of control in question and to avoid all interference which would not be in conformity with the principles governing the present Arrangement.

CONVENTION CONCERNING AFGHANISTAN.

The High Contracting Parties, in order to insure perfect security on their respective frontiers in Central Asia and to maintain in these regions a solid and lasting peace, have concluded the following Convention:

Art. I.—His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan.

His Britannic Majesty's Government further engage to exercise their influence in Afghanistan only in a pacific sense, and they will not themselves take, nor encourage Afghanistan to take, any measures threatening Russia.

The Russian Government, on their part, declare that they recognize Afghanistan as outside the sphere of Russian influence, and they engage that all their political relations with Afghanistan shall be conducted through the intermediary of His Britannic Majesty's Government; they further engage not to send any agents into Afghanistan.

Art. II.—The Government of His Britannic Majesty having declared in the treaty signed at Kabul on the 21st March, 1905,¹ that they recognize the Agreement and the engagements² concluded with the late Ameer AbdurRahman, and that they have no intention of interfering in the internal government of Afghan territory, Great Britain engages neither to annex nor to occupy in contravention of that Treaty any portion of Afghanistan or to interfere in the internal administration of the country, provided that the Ameer fulfils the engagements already contracted by him toward His Britannic Majesty's Government under the above-mentioned Treaty.

Art. III.—The Russian and Afghan authorities, specially designated for the purpose on the frontier or in the frontier provinces, may establish direct relations with each other for the settlement of local questions of a non-political character.

Art. IV.—His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Russian Government affirm their adherence to the principle of equality of commercial opportunity in Afghanistan, and they agree that any facilities which may have been, or shall be hereafter, obtained for British and British-Indian trade and traders, shall be equally enjoyed by Russian trade and traders. Should the progress of trade establish the necessity for commercial agents, the two Governments will agree as to what measures shall be taken, due regard, of course, being had to the Ameer's sovereign rights.

¹ 98 British and Foreign State Papers, 36-37; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXIV, 641-648.

² 95 British and Foreign State Papers, 1048-1049.

Art. V.—The present Arrangements will only come into force when His Britannic Majesty's Government shall have notified to the Russian Government the consent of the Ameer to the terms stipulated above.

ARRANGEMENT CONCERNING TIBET.

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia, recognizing the suzerain rights of China in Tibet, and considering the fact that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical position, has a special interest in the maintenance of the *status quo* in the external relations of Tibet, have made the following Arrangement:

Art. I.—The two High Contracting Parties engage to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet and to abstain from all interference in its internal administration.

Art. II.—In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Tibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. This engagement does not exclude the direct relations between British commercial agents and the Tibetan authorities provided for in Art. V of the Convention between Great Britain and Tibet of the 7th September, 1904,¹ and confirmed by the Convention between Great Britain and China of the 27th April, 1906;² nor does it modify the engagements entered into by Great Britain and China in Art. I of the said Convention of 1906.

It is clearly understood that Buddhists, subjects of Great Britain or of Russia, may enter into direct relations on strictly religious matters with the Dalai Lama and the other representatives of Buddhism in Tibet; the Governments of Great Britain and Russia engage, as far as they are concerned, not to allow those relations to infringe the stipulations of the present Arrangement.

Art. III.—The British and Russian Governments respectively engage not to send representatives to Lassa.

Art. IV.—The two High Contracting Parties engage neither to seek nor to obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs and mines, or other rights in Tibet.

Art. V.—The two Governments agree that no part of the revenues of Tibet, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to Great Britain or Russia or to any of their subjects.

¹ 98 British and Foreign State Papers, 148-151; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, I, 80-83.

² 99 British and Foreign State Papers, 171-173; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, I, 78-80.

ANNEX TO THE ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA
CONCERNING TIBET.

Great Britain reaffirms the Declaration, signed by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and appended to the ratification of the Convention of the 7th September, 1904, to the effect that the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by British forces cease after the payment of three annual instalments of the indemnity of 25,000,000 rupees, provided that the trade marts mentioned in Art. II of that Convention have been effectively opened for three years, and that in the meantime the Tibetan authorities have faithfully complied in all respects with the terms of the said Convention of 1904. It is clearly understood that if the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by the British forces has, for any reason, not been terminated at the time anticipated in the above Declaration, the British and Russian Governments will enter upon a friendly exchange of views on this subject.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at St. Petersburg as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention and affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at St. Petersburg, the 18th/31st August, 1907.

(L. S.)	A. NICOLSON
(L. S.)	IZVOLSKI.

INCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 2.—SIR ARTHUR NICOLSON TO ALEXANDER IZVOLSKI.

ST. PETERSBURG, August 18/31, 1907.

M. le Ministre,

With reference to the Arrangement regarding Tibet, signed to-day, I have the honor to make the following Declaration to your Excellency:

“His Britannic Majesty’s Government think it desirable, so far as they are concerned, not to allow, unless by a previous agreement with the Russian Government, for a period of three years from the date of the present communication, the entry into Tibet of any scientific mission whatever, on condition that a like assurance is given on the part of the Imperial Russian Government.

“His Britannic Majesty’s Government propose, moreover, to approach the Chinese Government with a view to induce them to accept a similar obligation for a corresponding period; the Russian Government will, as a matter of course, take similar action.

"At the expiration of the term of three years above-mentioned His Britannic Majesty's Government will, if necessary, consult with the Russian Government as to the desirability of any ulterior measures with regard to scientific expeditions to Tibet."

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

INCLOSURE 3 IN No. 2.—ALEXANDER IZVOLSKI TO SIR ARTHUR NICOLSON.

ST. PETERSBURG, August 18/31, 1907.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

In reply to your Excellency's note of even date, I have the honor to declare that the Imperial Russian Government think it desirable, so far as they are concerned, not to allow, unless by a previous agreement with the British Government, for a period of three years from the date of the present communication, the entry into Tibet of any scientific mission whatever.

Like the British Government, the Imperial Government propose to approach the Chinese Government with a view to induce them to accept a similar obligation for a corresponding period.

It is understood that at the expiration of the term of three years the two Governments will, if necessary, consult with each other as to the desirability of any ulterior measures with regard to scientific expeditions to Tibet.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) IZVOLSKI.

IV. ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE.

I. AGREEMENT BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND JAPAN RELATIVE TO CHINA AND KOREA (ALLIANCE, ETC.), SIGNED AT LONDON, JANUARY 30, 1902.¹

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a desire to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the extreme East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea, and in

¹ 95 British and Foreign State Papers, 83-84; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXX, 650-651; (XXXI, 258-26); Foreign Relations of the United States, 1902, 514; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, I, 14-15.

The dispatch forwarding the text of the agreement to the British minister at Tokyo is printed, 95 British and Foreign State Papers, 84-86; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXI, 258-61.

securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, hereby agree as follows:

Art. I.—The high contracting parties, having mutually recognized the independence of China and of Korea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view, however, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically, as well as commercially and industrially, in Korea, the high contracting parties recognize that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other power, or by disturbances arising in China or Korea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the high contracting parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects.

Art. II.—If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defense of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another power, the other high contracting party will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.

Art. III.—If in the above event any other power or powers should join in hostilities against that ally, the other high contracting party will come to its assistance and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

Art. IV.—The high contracting parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another power to the prejudice of the interests above described.

Art. V.—Whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, the above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly.

Art. VI.—The present agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for five years from that date.

In case neither of the high contracting parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said five years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the high contracting parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, *ipso facto*, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this agreement, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at London the 30th January, 1902.

[L. S.] LANSDOWNE,

*His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs.*

[L. S.] HAYASHI,

*Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan
at the Court of St. James.*

2. AGREEMENT BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND JAPAN RELATIVE TO EASTERN ASIA (CHINA AND KOREA) AND INDIA, SIGNED AT LONDON, AUGUST 12, 1905.¹

The following provisions appeared in the revision of August 12, 1905, which otherwise was identic with the preamble, Arts. I, II, III, V and VI of the revision of 1911:

Art. III.—Japan possessing paramount political, military and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.

Art. IV.—Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.

Art. VI.—As regards the present war between Japan and Russia, Great Britain will continue to maintain strict neutrality unless some other power or powers should join in hostilities against Japan, in which case Great Britain will come to the assistance of Japan, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with Japan.

¹ 98 British and Foreign State Papers, 136-138, *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXV, 403-405; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, I, 15-17; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1905, 288.

A dispatch forwarding a copy of the agreement to the British ambassador at Tokyo dated September 6, 1905, is printed, 98 British and Foreign State Papers, 138-140; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2^e série, XXXV, 402-3.

3. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND JAPAN RESPECTING RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN EASTERN ASIA AND INDIA SIGNED AT LONDON, JULY 13, 1911.¹

PREAMBLE.

The Government of Great Britain and the Government of Japan, having in view the important changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese agreement of the 12th August, 1905, and believing that a revision of that agreement responding to such changes would contribute to general stability and repose, have agreed upon the following stipulations to replace the agreement above mentioned, such stipulations having the same object as the said agreement, namely:

(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India;

(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defense of their special interests in the said regions:

Article I—It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests.

Art. II—If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any Power or Powers, either High Contracting Party should be involved in war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this agreement, the other High Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

Art. III—The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with

¹ 104 British and Foreign State Papers, 173-174; *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3^e série, V, 3-4; American Journal of International Law, Supplement, V, 276-278; Treaty Series, No. 18, 1911.

another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this agreement.

Art. IV—Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.

Art. V—The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the naval and military authorities of the High Contracting Parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.

Art. VI—The present agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, *ipso facto*, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this agreement, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at London, the 13th day of July, 1911.

E. GREY,

*His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs.*

TAKAAKI KATO,

*Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of
Japan at the Court of St. James.*

V. ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ALLIANCE.

The Anglo-Portuguese alliance, the oldest instance of political co-operation in the world and the longest-existing alliance in history, has been continuously effective since 1373 and at the present writing is 545 years old. Of the various treaties constituting it those portions which indicate the limits of the alliance are printed below:

I. TREATY OF PEACE, FRIENDSHIP AND ALLIANCE BETWEEN ENGLAND AND PORTUGAL, SIGNED AT LONDON, JUNE 16, 1373.¹

Whereas the Fidalgo John Ferdinand de Andeiro, of the Army, and the venerable and discreet Senhor Velasco Domingo, Precentor of the Cathedral of Braga, deputed by the Illustrious and Magnificent Prince the Lord Ferdinand, by the grace of God King of Portugal and Algarve, and by the Most Illustrious Lady Eleanor, Queen and Consort of the same, did, some time ago, come personally, as ambassadors, proctors, and special messengers, to the presence of the above-mentioned Lord our King, in order to manifest the alliances, unions, confederacies and leagues of pure affection reciprocally entered into, contracted and ordained, between the said King of Portugal and the Queen, and the Illustrious and Magnificent Prince, the Lord John, by the grace of God King of Castile and Leon, Duke of Lancaster, the very dear Son of our said Lord the King of England, and the sentiments of sincere affection derived not only thence but from the bonds of near consanguinity and ancient friendship between them and their ancestors, of revered memory, which affection the said King and Queen of Portugal had cherished, and would ever cherish, from their hearts, as well toward the person of the said Lord our King, as toward his Sons and rights, and to their subjects, ardently wishing their welfare and honor, and desirous to make a firm stand against the malice of their enemies, and the fraudulent machinations and designs wickedly conceived against the aforesaid King our Lord, and against his sons, realm, dominions, lands and subjects, as also cordially solicitous to enter into, contract and agree upon amities, alliances, unions, good confederacies and leagues of pure love, with our Lord the King, and with his first-born Son, the Lord Edward,

¹ British and Foreign State Papers, Part 1, 462-466. For the original Latin and Portuguese texts see Rymer's *Foedera*, VII, 15, and *ibid.* (Hague edition), III, Part 2, 8. The English full powers were dated June 1, 1373, and are printed in Rymer's *Foedera*, VII, 11.

Prince of Wales, and with the other Sons of the same Lord our King (with whom they had not yet formed any alliances), with the Kingdom of England, and all his future Successors in the said Kingdom of England; and, finally, with the other lands, dominions or places, and his faithfully obedient vassals and subjects, against all men that may live or die, of whatever station, condition, rank or dignity they may be, and against their kingdoms, dominions, lands and provinces, (alone, and especially excepting and preserving intact and inviolate the State of the Apostolic See, and of our Lord the Pope,) . . .

We, on our part, anxious strictly to obey the Royal Orders of our aforesaid Liege Lord, as our fidelity requires, and duly to execute what in this respect belongs to our duty, in virtue of the power conferred upon us to this effect, and of the trust which we have assumed, after sufficient deliberation, contract, make and establish with the ambassadors above-mentioned, who have expressly consented to it in lieu and in the names of the Persons before stated, in manner and form hereinafter set forth, alliances, confederacies, friendships, unions and leagues of sincere affection, which, under favor of the Most High, shall for ever more inviolably be observed.

Art. I. In the first place, we settle and covenant that there shall be from this day forward between our abovesaid Lord Edward, King of England and France, and the Lord Ferdinand, King of Portugal and Algarve, and the Lady Eleanor Queen and his Consort, their Successors in the aforesaid Kingdoms of England and Portugal, and their realms, lands, dominions, provinces, vassals and subjects faithfully obeying them, whatsoever, true, faithful, constant, mutual and perpetual friendships, unions, alliances and leagues of sincere affection, and that as true and faithful Friends they shall henceforth reciprocally be Friends to Friends, and Enemies to Enemies, and shall assist, maintain and uphold each other mutually by sea and by land against all men that may live or die, of whatever dignity, station, rank or condition they may be, and against their lands, realms and dominions.

They shall strive for and preserve, as much as in them lies, the personal safety, security, interest and honor, and the harmlessness, conservation and restitution of their rights, property, effects, and Friends, whatsoever they be.

They shall everywhere faithfully prevent the hurts and injuries, disgrace or baseness which they know or which one Party knows to be at any future time intended or contemplated against the other Party, and shall provide remedies for them; and they shall as expeditiously as may be, by letters

or messengers, or in any better way which they can contrive without reserve and fully inform, forewarn and usefully counsel the other Party against whom such things are meditating, relative to what has just been mentioned.

II. Also, neither Party shall form friendships with the Enemies, Rivals or Persecutors of the other Party; or knowingly himself or through others advise, aid or favor the Enemies, Rivals, or Persecutors of the other Party, to his detriment, hurt or prejudice; or gratify them in any way, receive them into his Kingdom or Kingdoms, Lands, Dominions, Provinces or Places, or knowingly suffer them to be gratified, received, countenanced or harbored, either publicly or privately under any specious excuses, contrivances or pretexts; without, however, including under the domination of Enemies, Rivals or Persecutors, such as shall now or hereafter for any reason whatsoever have fled, been exiled or banished from the Kingdom or from the other Provinces, Lands, Dominions or Places of either of the same Kings, but, on the contrary, declaring it lawful reciprocally to grant to such Persons reception and countenance in the Kingdom, and in any Lands and Places subjected to the other King, unless indeed such fugitives, exiles and outlaws shall have been capitally convicted of high treason, and as traitors to the King and the Kingdom, or shall lie under the suspicion of having afforded occasion for reasonable fear of their design to compass the hurt, disgrace, injury or exasperation of both Parties or either of them, so that they ought to be justly avoided as Foes and Persecutors; in which case either Party, on being required by the other, shall be obliged either to deliver up such men as have been before described, if demanded, to the requiring Party, or to expel, banish or dismiss them from his vicinity, his Kingdoms, Dominions and Lands.

III. Also if the Kingdom, Lands, Dominions or Places of the other Party should happen to be infested, oppressed or invaded by sea or by land by Enemies, Persecutors or Rivals, or if these Enemies should at least purpose, prepare, or in any manner appear anxious to infest, oppress or invade, and the other Party, or his Successors, be through that Party against whom similar attempts are making, by letters or by trusty messengers applied to for assistance or succor of troops, archers, slingers, ships, galleys, sufficiently armed for war, or any other kind of defense (provided such defense, or any of those before mentioned, exist or be used in the Kingdom of which the above succor is demanded), then shall the said Party so required *bona fide* furnish, supply and send the said succor to the requiring Party for the protection of the Kingdom menaced with such invasions, or of the other Provinces, Dominions or Places, and for the

recovery of them when lost by the like invasions, against the said Enemies, Invaders or Persecutors, or against such as intend to invade or persecute, of whatever station, condition, rank and dignity they may be, as often as, and whenever such Party shall, without great injury to his Country, be able to spare a certain proportion of armed troops, archers, slingers, ships and galleys sufficiently supplied with all requisites and other kinds of defense (except when their price is excessive or they are needed in the Country), at the cost, expense and pay of the Party requiring, to be strictly estimated by four military men of experience or able and discreet members of the legal profession (of whom two are to be deputed or chosen by each Party) according to the quality of the individuals to be sent, and their grades, to the circumstances of the times, and to the markets of the places in which the persons dispatched shall have to exert their valor or military skill, within such times as, after the aforesaid requisition, a similar succor ought to be prepared and sent, regard being had both to the pressing occasion of the Party requiring, and to the possibility of the Party called upon being able to complete his preparations, it being understood that throughout these proceedings no duplicity and unfairness shall appear, but that the strait path of equitable dealing and benignity shall be pursued.

Furthermore, to the end that the above, collectively and singly, may really be fulfilled and faithfully observed, we the aforesaid proctors, in lieu and in the names of those above mentioned, promise *bona fide* and take our oath on the soul of our said Lord the King of England by touching the holy Gospels; that he, our Lord the King, will with all his might and senses keep, fulfil and inviolably observe, in whole and in part, the above-written alliances, friendships, unions, confederacies and conventions, and all the articles and clauses of them (provided always that they do not interfere with former alliances), will cause them to be kept, fulfilled and inviolably observed, and will neither transgress at any future time nor knowingly suffer to be in any way transgressed the above stipulations, or any of them, in whole or in part, by breaking, infringing or violating them knowingly, or by causing or suffering them to be infringed, violated or broken, on pretense of any excuse or exception, fraud or deceit, error, coercion, written law, custom, act or intention, or privilege obtained or to be obtained.

2. TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN ENGLAND AND PORTUGAL, SIGNED AT WINDSOR, MAY 9, 1386.¹

VII. Further, it is agreed, that if either of the aforesaid Parties can learn, discover or anticipate any injury, contumely or disadvantage to have been planned or meditated against the other Party, on sea or land, manifestly or privately, he shall prevent it as much as in him lies, as though he were desirous of preventing the injury and contumely intended to his own interest, and shall endeavor, by all means in his power, that such design, with all the particulars connected with it, may be brought to the notice of the other Party against which it is so intended, and every artifice, deceit and invention shall be abstained from.

3. TREATY OF DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND PORTUGAL, SIGNED AT LISBON, MAY 16, 1703.²

I. All former treaties between the abovesaid Powers are hereby approved, confirmed and ratified, and are ordered to be exactly and faithfully observed, except in so far as by the present treaty is otherwise provided and established; so that there shall be between the said Kingdoms and States, their people and subjects, a sincere friendship and perfect amity; they shall all of them mutually assist one another; and each of the said Powers shall promote the interest and advantage of the rest, as if it were his own.³

¹ 1 British and Foreign State Papers, Part 1, 472; Rymer's *Foedera*, VII, 515. On the preceding April 28 England signed a treaty of alliance and mutual assistance with King John of Castile, Duke of Lancaster (Rymer's *Foedera*, VII, 510). The Portuguese treaty of alliance was confirmed on June 20 (Rymer's *Foedera*, VII, 525).

² 1 British and Foreign State Papers, Part 1, 502.

³ The present Government of Portugal, following its accession to power as the result of revolution, issued the following statement on December 18, 1917:


"Efforts are being made in certain quarters to suggest the idea that the recent revolution in Portugal was carried out in the interest of the monarchy with the assistance of Spanish and other foreign elements and that it was essentially a movement in favor of Germany and against the Allies.

"There is not a scintilla of truth in any one of these suggestions. They are merely one more device of the all-pervading German propaganda intended to sow dissension among the Allies. Their character can easily be appraised by noting the quarters in which they are put forth.

"The foreign policy of the new Portuguese government rests and will continue to rest on the maintenance of the alliance with England in hearty co-operation with the other allies.

"The hostile attitude of the German press toward the new situation in Portugal and the bombardment of the Portuguese port of Funchal by a German submarine, directly the success of the revolution became known, clearly show the flimsy nature of the German propaganda's latest stratagem."
—(Associated Press dispatch, December 18, 1917.)





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